VYPR
Low severityNVD Advisory· Published Sep 21, 2023· Updated Feb 13, 2025

Zope vulnerable to Stored Cross Site Scripting with SVG images

CVE-2023-42458

Description

Zope is an open-source web application server. Prior to versions 4.8.10 and 5.8.5, there is a stored cross site scripting vulnerability for SVG images. Note that an image tag with an SVG image as source is never vulnerable, even when the SVG image contains malicious code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker would first need to upload an image, and then trick a user into following a specially crafted link. Patches are available in Zope 4.8.10 and 5.8.5. As a workaround, make sure the "Add Documents, Images, and Files" permission is only assigned to trusted roles. By default, only the Manager has this permission.

Affected packages

Versions sourced from the GitHub Security Advisory.

PackageAffected versionsPatched versions
ZopePyPI
< 4.8.104.8.10
ZopePyPI
>= 5.8.0, < 5.8.55.8.5

Affected products

1

Patches

2
26a55dbc301d

Merge pull request from GHSA-wm8q-9975-xh5v

https://github.com/zopefoundation/ZopeMaurits van ReesSep 21, 2023via ghsa
3 files changed · +165 0
  • CHANGES.rst+10 0 modified
    @@ -10,6 +10,16 @@ https://zope.readthedocs.io/en/2.13/CHANGES.html
     4.8.10 (unreleased)
     -------------------
     
    +- Allow only some image types to be displayed inline. Force download for
    +  others, especially SVG images.  By default we use a list of allowed types.
    +  You can switch a to a list of denied types by setting OS environment variable
    +  ``OFS_IMAGE_USE_DENYLIST=1``.  You can override the allowed list with
    +  environment variable ``ALLOWED_INLINE_MIMETYPES`` and the disallowed list
    +  with ``DISALLOWED_INLINE_MIMETYPES``.  Separate multiple entries by either
    +  comma or space.  This change only affects direct URL access.
    +  ``<img src="image.svg" />`` works the same as before. (CVE-2023-42458)
    +  See `security advisory <https://github.com/zopefoundation/Zope/security/advisories/GHSA-wm8q-9975-xh5v>`_.
    +
     - Tighten down the ZMI frame source logic to only allow site-local sources.
       Problem reported by Miguel Segovia Gil.
     
    
  • src/OFS/Image.py+99 0 modified
    @@ -13,16 +13,19 @@
     """Image object
     """
     
    +import os
     import struct
     from email.generator import _make_boundary
     from io import BytesIO
     from io import TextIOBase
    +from mimetypes import guess_extension
     from tempfile import TemporaryFile
     from warnings import warn
     
     from six import PY2
     from six import binary_type
     from six import text_type
    +from six.moves.urllib.parse import quote
     
     import ZPublisher.HTTPRequest
     from AccessControl.class_init import InitializeClass
    @@ -61,6 +64,64 @@
         from cgi import escape
     
     
    +def _get_list_from_env(name, default=None):
    +    """Get list from environment variable.
    +
    +    Supports splitting on comma or white space.
    +    Use the default as fallback only when the variable is not set.
    +    So if the env variable is set to an empty string, this will ignore the
    +    default and return an empty list.
    +    """
    +    value = os.environ.get(name)
    +    if value is None:
    +        return default or []
    +    value = value.strip()
    +    if "," in value:
    +        return value.split(",")
    +    return value.split()
    +
    +
    +# We have one list for allowed, and one for disallowed inline mimetypes.
    +# This is for security purposes.
    +# By default we use the allowlist.  We give integrators the option to choose
    +# the denylist via an environment variable.
    +ALLOWED_INLINE_MIMETYPES = _get_list_from_env(
    +    "ALLOWED_INLINE_MIMETYPES",
    +    default=[
    +        "image/gif",
    +        # The mimetypes registry lists several for jpeg 2000:
    +        "image/jp2",
    +        "image/jpeg",
    +        "image/jpeg2000-image",
    +        "image/jpeg2000",
    +        "image/jpx",
    +        "image/png",
    +        "image/webp",
    +        "image/x-icon",
    +        "image/x-jpeg2000-image",
    +        "text/plain",
    +        # By popular request we allow PDF:
    +        "application/pdf",
    +    ]
    +)
    +DISALLOWED_INLINE_MIMETYPES = _get_list_from_env(
    +    "DISALLOWED_INLINE_MIMETYPES",
    +    default=[
    +        "application/javascript",
    +        "application/x-javascript",
    +        "text/javascript",
    +        "text/html",
    +        "image/svg+xml",
    +        "image/svg+xml-compressed",
    +    ]
    +)
    +try:
    +    USE_DENYLIST = os.environ.get("OFS_IMAGE_USE_DENYLIST")
    +    USE_DENYLIST = bool(int(USE_DENYLIST))
    +except (ValueError, TypeError, AttributeError):
    +    USE_DENYLIST = False
    +
    +
     manage_addFileForm = DTMLFile(
         'dtml/imageAdd',
         globals(),
    @@ -120,6 +181,13 @@ class File(
         Cacheable
     ):
         """A File object is a content object for arbitrary files."""
    +    # You can control which mimetypes may be shown inline
    +    # and which must always be downloaded, for security reasons.
    +    # Make the configuration available on the class.
    +    # Then subclasses can override this.
    +    allowed_inline_mimetypes = ALLOWED_INLINE_MIMETYPES
    +    disallowed_inline_mimetypes = DISALLOWED_INLINE_MIMETYPES
    +    use_denylist = USE_DENYLIST
     
         meta_type = 'File'
         zmi_icon = 'far fa-file-archive'
    @@ -418,6 +486,19 @@ def _range_request_handler(self, REQUEST, RESPONSE):
                             b'\r\n--' + boundary.encode('ascii') + b'--\r\n')
                         return True
     
    +    def _should_force_download(self):
    +        # If this returns True, the caller should set a
    +        # Content-Disposition header with filename.
    +        mimetype = self.content_type
    +        if not mimetype:
    +            return False
    +        if self.use_denylist:
    +            # We explicitly deny a few mimetypes, and allow the rest.
    +            return mimetype in self.disallowed_inline_mimetypes
    +        # Use the allowlist.
    +        # We only explicitly allow a few mimetypes, and deny the rest.
    +        return mimetype not in self.allowed_inline_mimetypes
    +
         @security.protected(View)
         def index_html(self, REQUEST, RESPONSE):
             """
    @@ -456,6 +537,24 @@ def index_html(self, REQUEST, RESPONSE):
             RESPONSE.setHeader('Content-Length', self.size)
             RESPONSE.setHeader('Accept-Ranges', 'bytes')
     
    +        if self._should_force_download():
    +            # We need a filename, even a dummy one if needed.
    +            filename = self.getId()
    +            if "." not in filename:
    +                # This either returns None or ".some_extension"
    +                ext = guess_extension(self.content_type, strict=False)
    +                if not ext:
    +                    # image/svg+xml -> svg
    +                    ext = "." + self.content_type.split("/")[-1].split("+")[0]
    +                filename += ext
    +            if not isinstance(filename, bytes):
    +                filename = filename.encode("utf8")
    +            filename = quote(filename)
    +            RESPONSE.setHeader(
    +                "Content-Disposition",
    +                "attachment; filename*=UTF-8''{}".format(filename),
    +            )
    +
             if self.ZCacheable_isCachingEnabled():
                 result = self.ZCacheable_get(default=None)
                 if result is not None:
    
  • src/OFS/tests/testFileAndImage.py+56 0 modified
    @@ -368,6 +368,7 @@ def testViewImageOrFile(self):
             response = request.RESPONSE
             result = self.file.index_html(request, response)
             self.assertEqual(result, self.data)
    +        self.assertIsNone(response.getHeader("Content-Disposition"))
     
         def test_interfaces(self):
             from OFS.Image import Image
    @@ -382,6 +383,61 @@ def test_text_representation_is_tag(self):
                              ' alt="" title="" height="16" width="16" />')
     
     
    +class SVGTests(ImageTests):
    +    content_type = 'image/svg+xml'
    +
    +    def testViewImageOrFile(self):
    +        request = self.app.REQUEST
    +        response = request.RESPONSE
    +        result = self.file.index_html(request, response)
    +        self.assertEqual(result, self.data)
    +        self.assertEqual(
    +            response.getHeader("Content-Disposition"),
    +            "attachment; filename*=UTF-8''file.svg",
    +        )
    +
    +    def testViewImageOrFileNonAscii(self):
    +        try:
    +            factory = getattr(self.app, self.factory)
    +            factory('hällo',
    +                    file=self.data, content_type=self.content_type)
    +            transaction.commit()
    +        except Exception:
    +            transaction.abort()
    +            self.connection.close()
    +            raise
    +        transaction.begin()
    +        image = getattr(self.app, 'hällo')
    +        request = self.app.REQUEST
    +        response = request.RESPONSE
    +        result = image.index_html(request, response)
    +        self.assertEqual(result, self.data)
    +        self.assertEqual(
    +            response.getHeader("Content-Disposition"),
    +            "attachment; filename*=UTF-8''h%C3%A4llo.svg",
    +        )
    +
    +    def testViewImageOrFile_with_denylist(self):
    +        request = self.app.REQUEST
    +        response = request.RESPONSE
    +        self.file.use_denylist = True
    +        result = self.file.index_html(request, response)
    +        self.assertEqual(result, self.data)
    +        self.assertEqual(
    +            response.getHeader("Content-Disposition"),
    +            "attachment; filename*=UTF-8''file.svg",
    +        )
    +
    +    def testViewImageOrFile_with_empty_denylist(self):
    +        request = self.app.REQUEST
    +        response = request.RESPONSE
    +        self.file.use_denylist = True
    +        self.file.disallowed_inline_mimetypes = []
    +        result = self.file.index_html(request, response)
    +        self.assertEqual(result, self.data)
    +        self.assertIsNone(response.getHeader("Content-Disposition"))
    +
    +
     class FileEditTests(Testing.ZopeTestCase.FunctionalTestCase):
         """Browser testing ..Image.File"""
     
    
603b0a12881c

Merge pull request from GHSA-wm8q-9975-xh5v

https://github.com/zopefoundation/ZopeMaurits van ReesSep 21, 2023via ghsa
3 files changed · +163 0
  • CHANGES.rst+10 0 modified
    @@ -11,6 +11,16 @@ https://github.com/zopefoundation/Zope/blob/4.x/CHANGES.rst
     5.8.5 (unreleased)
     ------------------
     
    +- Allow only some image types to be displayed inline. Force download for
    +  others, especially SVG images.  By default we use a list of allowed types.
    +  You can switch a to a list of denied types by setting OS environment variable
    +  ``OFS_IMAGE_USE_DENYLIST=1``.  You can override the allowed list with
    +  environment variable ``ALLOWED_INLINE_MIMETYPES`` and the disallowed list
    +  with ``DISALLOWED_INLINE_MIMETYPES``.  Separate multiple entries by either
    +  comma or space.  This change only affects direct URL access.
    +  ``<img src="image.svg" />`` works the same as before. (CVE-2023-42458)
    +  See `security advisory <https://github.com/zopefoundation/Zope/security/advisories/GHSA-wm8q-9975-xh5v>`_.
    +
     - Tighten down the ZMI frame source logic to only allow site-local sources.
       Problem reported by Miguel Segovia Gil.
     
    
  • src/OFS/Image.py+97 0 modified
    @@ -14,9 +14,12 @@
     """
     
     import html
    +import os
     import struct
     from email.generator import _make_boundary
     from io import BytesIO
    +from mimetypes import guess_extension
    +from urllib.parse import quote
     from xml.dom import minidom
     
     import ZPublisher.HTTPRequest
    @@ -48,6 +51,64 @@
     from ZPublisher.HTTPRequest import FileUpload
     
     
    +def _get_list_from_env(name, default=None):
    +    """Get list from environment variable.
    +
    +    Supports splitting on comma or white space.
    +    Use the default as fallback only when the variable is not set.
    +    So if the env variable is set to an empty string, this will ignore the
    +    default and return an empty list.
    +    """
    +    value = os.environ.get(name)
    +    if value is None:
    +        return default or []
    +    value = value.strip()
    +    if "," in value:
    +        return value.split(",")
    +    return value.split()
    +
    +
    +# We have one list for allowed, and one for disallowed inline mimetypes.
    +# This is for security purposes.
    +# By default we use the allowlist.  We give integrators the option to choose
    +# the denylist via an environment variable.
    +ALLOWED_INLINE_MIMETYPES = _get_list_from_env(
    +    "ALLOWED_INLINE_MIMETYPES",
    +    default=[
    +        "image/gif",
    +        # The mimetypes registry lists several for jpeg 2000:
    +        "image/jp2",
    +        "image/jpeg",
    +        "image/jpeg2000-image",
    +        "image/jpeg2000",
    +        "image/jpx",
    +        "image/png",
    +        "image/webp",
    +        "image/x-icon",
    +        "image/x-jpeg2000-image",
    +        "text/plain",
    +        # By popular request we allow PDF:
    +        "application/pdf",
    +    ]
    +)
    +DISALLOWED_INLINE_MIMETYPES = _get_list_from_env(
    +    "DISALLOWED_INLINE_MIMETYPES",
    +    default=[
    +        "application/javascript",
    +        "application/x-javascript",
    +        "text/javascript",
    +        "text/html",
    +        "image/svg+xml",
    +        "image/svg+xml-compressed",
    +    ]
    +)
    +try:
    +    USE_DENYLIST = os.environ.get("OFS_IMAGE_USE_DENYLIST")
    +    USE_DENYLIST = bool(int(USE_DENYLIST))
    +except (ValueError, TypeError, AttributeError):
    +    USE_DENYLIST = False
    +
    +
     manage_addFileForm = DTMLFile(
         'dtml/imageAdd',
         globals(),
    @@ -107,6 +168,13 @@ class File(
         Cacheable
     ):
         """A File object is a content object for arbitrary files."""
    +    # You can control which mimetypes may be shown inline
    +    # and which must always be downloaded, for security reasons.
    +    # Make the configuration available on the class.
    +    # Then subclasses can override this.
    +    allowed_inline_mimetypes = ALLOWED_INLINE_MIMETYPES
    +    disallowed_inline_mimetypes = DISALLOWED_INLINE_MIMETYPES
    +    use_denylist = USE_DENYLIST
     
         meta_type = 'File'
         zmi_icon = 'far fa-file-archive'
    @@ -403,6 +471,19 @@ def _range_request_handler(self, REQUEST, RESPONSE):
                             b'\r\n--' + boundary.encode('ascii') + b'--\r\n')
                         return True
     
    +    def _should_force_download(self):
    +        # If this returns True, the caller should set a
    +        # Content-Disposition header with filename.
    +        mimetype = self.content_type
    +        if not mimetype:
    +            return False
    +        if self.use_denylist:
    +            # We explicitly deny a few mimetypes, and allow the rest.
    +            return mimetype in self.disallowed_inline_mimetypes
    +        # Use the allowlist.
    +        # We only explicitly allow a few mimetypes, and deny the rest.
    +        return mimetype not in self.allowed_inline_mimetypes
    +
         @security.protected(View)
         def index_html(self, REQUEST, RESPONSE):
             """
    @@ -441,6 +522,22 @@ def index_html(self, REQUEST, RESPONSE):
             RESPONSE.setHeader('Content-Length', self.size)
             RESPONSE.setHeader('Accept-Ranges', 'bytes')
     
    +        if self._should_force_download():
    +            # We need a filename, even a dummy one if needed.
    +            filename = self.getId()
    +            if "." not in filename:
    +                # This either returns None or ".some_extension"
    +                ext = guess_extension(self.content_type, strict=False)
    +                if not ext:
    +                    # image/svg+xml -> svg
    +                    ext = "." + self.content_type.split("/")[-1].split("+")[0]
    +                filename += f"{ext}"
    +            filename = quote(filename.encode("utf8"))
    +            RESPONSE.setHeader(
    +                "Content-Disposition",
    +                f"attachment; filename*=UTF-8''{filename}",
    +            )
    +
             if self.ZCacheable_isCachingEnabled():
                 result = self.ZCacheable_get(default=None)
                 if result is not None:
    
  • src/OFS/tests/testFileAndImage.py+56 0 modified
    @@ -373,6 +373,7 @@ def testViewImageOrFile(self):
             response = request.RESPONSE
             result = self.file.index_html(request, response)
             self.assertEqual(result, self.data)
    +        self.assertIsNone(response.getHeader("Content-Disposition"))
     
         def test_interfaces(self):
             from OFS.Image import Image
    @@ -387,6 +388,61 @@ def test_text_representation_is_tag(self):
                              ' alt="" title="" height="16" width="16" />')
     
     
    +class SVGTests(ImageTests):
    +    content_type = 'image/svg+xml'
    +
    +    def testViewImageOrFile(self):
    +        request = self.app.REQUEST
    +        response = request.RESPONSE
    +        result = self.file.index_html(request, response)
    +        self.assertEqual(result, self.data)
    +        self.assertEqual(
    +            response.getHeader("Content-Disposition"),
    +            "attachment; filename*=UTF-8''file.svg",
    +        )
    +
    +    def testViewImageOrFileNonAscii(self):
    +        try:
    +            factory = getattr(self.app, self.factory)
    +            factory('hällo',
    +                    file=self.data, content_type=self.content_type)
    +            transaction.commit()
    +        except Exception:
    +            transaction.abort()
    +            self.connection.close()
    +            raise
    +        transaction.begin()
    +        image = getattr(self.app, 'hällo')
    +        request = self.app.REQUEST
    +        response = request.RESPONSE
    +        result = image.index_html(request, response)
    +        self.assertEqual(result, self.data)
    +        self.assertEqual(
    +            response.getHeader("Content-Disposition"),
    +            "attachment; filename*=UTF-8''h%C3%A4llo.svg",
    +        )
    +
    +    def testViewImageOrFile_with_denylist(self):
    +        request = self.app.REQUEST
    +        response = request.RESPONSE
    +        self.file.use_denylist = True
    +        result = self.file.index_html(request, response)
    +        self.assertEqual(result, self.data)
    +        self.assertEqual(
    +            response.getHeader("Content-Disposition"),
    +            "attachment; filename*=UTF-8''file.svg",
    +        )
    +
    +    def testViewImageOrFile_with_empty_denylist(self):
    +        request = self.app.REQUEST
    +        response = request.RESPONSE
    +        self.file.use_denylist = True
    +        self.file.disallowed_inline_mimetypes = []
    +        result = self.file.index_html(request, response)
    +        self.assertEqual(result, self.data)
    +        self.assertIsNone(response.getHeader("Content-Disposition"))
    +
    +
     class FileEditTests(Testing.ZopeTestCase.FunctionalTestCase):
         """Browser testing ..Image.File"""
     
    

Vulnerability mechanics

Generated on May 9, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.

References

6

News mentions

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