API token authentication bypass in HTTP endpoints in Dapr

@@ -2,7 +2,28 @@
 
 This update contains security fixes:
 
-  - [Security: Potential DoS in avro dependency (CVE-2023-37475)](#security-potential-dos-in-avro-dependency-cve-2023-37475)
+  - [Security: API token authentication bypass in HTTP endpoints](#security-api-token-authentication-bypass-in-http-endpoints) ([Security advisory](https://github.com/dapr/dapr/security/advisories/GHSA-59m6-82qm-vqgj))
+  - [Security: Potential DoS in avro dependency](#security-potential-dos-in-avro-dependency-cve-2023-37475) ([CVE-2023-37475](https://github.com/hamba/avro/security/advisories/GHSA-9x44-9pgq-cf45))
+
+## Security: API token authentication bypass in HTTP endpoints
+
+### Problem
+
+[Security advisory](https://github.com/dapr/dapr/security/advisories/GHSA-59m6-82qm-vqgj)
+
+A high-severity vulnerability has been found in Dapr that allows bypassing [API token authentication](https://docs.dapr.io/operations/security/api-token/), which is used by the Dapr sidecar to authenticate calls coming from the application, with a well-crafted HTTP request.
+
+### Impact
+
+The vulnerability impacts all users on Dapr <=1.10.9 and <=1.11.2 who are using API token authentication.
+
+### Root cause
+
+The Dapr sidecar allowed all requests containing `/healthz` in the URL (including query string) to bypass API token authentication.
+
+### Solution
+
+We have changed the API token authentication middleware to allow bypassing the authentication only for healthcheck endpoints more strictly.
 
 ## Security: Potential DoS in avro dependency (CVE-2023-37475)
 

@@ -287,12 +287,29 @@ func useAPIAuthentication(next fasthttp.RequestHandler) fasthttp.RequestHandler
 
 	return func(ctx *fasthttp.RequestCtx) {
 		v := ctx.Request.Header.Peek(authConsts.APITokenHeader)
-		if auth.ExcludedRoute(string(ctx.Request.URI().FullURI())) || string(v) == token {
-			ctx.Request.Header.Del(authConsts.APITokenHeader)
-			next(ctx)
-		} else {
+		if string(v) != token && !isRouteExcludedFromAPITokenAuth(string(ctx.Request.Header.Method()), string(ctx.Request.URI().FullURI())) {
 			ctx.Error("invalid api token", http.StatusUnauthorized)
+			return
 		}
+
+		ctx.Request.Header.Del(authConsts.APITokenHeader)
+		next(ctx)
+	}
+}
+
+func isRouteExcludedFromAPITokenAuth(method string, urlString string) bool {
+	u, err := url.Parse(urlString)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	path := strings.Trim(u.Path, "/")
+	switch path {
+	case apiVersionV1 + "/healthz":
+		return method == http.MethodGet
+	case apiVersionV1 + "/healthz/outbound":
+		return method == http.MethodGet
+	default:
+		return false
 	}
 }
 

@@ -15,13 +15,10 @@ package security
 
 import (
 	"os"
-	"strings"
 
 	"github.com/dapr/dapr/pkg/runtime/security/consts"
 )
 
-var excludedRoutes = []string{"/healthz"}
-
 // GetAPIToken returns the value of the api token from an environment variable.
 func GetAPIToken() string {
 	return os.Getenv(consts.APITokenEnvVar)
@@ -31,13 +28,3 @@ func GetAPIToken() string {
 func GetAppToken() string {
 	return os.Getenv(consts.AppAPITokenEnvVar)
 }
-
-// ExcludedRoute returns whether a given route should be excluded from a token check.
-func ExcludedRoute(route string) bool {
-	for _, r := range excludedRoutes {
-		if strings.Contains(route, r) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}

@@ -54,17 +54,3 @@ func TestAppToken(t *testing.T) {
 		assert.Equal(t, "", token)
 	})
 }
-
-func TestExcludedRoute(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Run("healthz route is excluded", func(t *testing.T) {
-		route := "v1.0/healthz"
-		excluded := ExcludedRoute(route)
-		assert.True(t, excluded)
-	})
-
-	t.Run("custom route is not excluded", func(t *testing.T) {
-		route := "v1.0/state"
-		excluded := ExcludedRoute(route)
-		assert.False(t, excluded)
-	})
-}

@@ -2,14 +2,35 @@
 
 This update contains security fixes:
 
-  - [Security: Potential DoS in avro dependency (CVE-2023-37475)](#security-potential-dos-in-avro-dependency-cve-2023-37475)
+  - [Security: API token authentication bypass in HTTP endpoints](#security-api-token-authentication-bypass-in-http-endpoints) ([Security advisory](https://github.com/dapr/dapr/security/advisories/GHSA-59m6-82qm-vqgj))
+  - [Security: Potential DoS in avro dependency](#security-potential-dos-in-avro-dependency-cve-2023-37475) ([CVE-2023-37475](https://github.com/hamba/avro/security/advisories/GHSA-9x44-9pgq-cf45))
 
 Additionally, this patch release contains bug fixes:
 
   - [Fixed: unbounded history batch save in Workflows](#fixed-unbounded-history-batch-save-in-workflows)
   - [Fixed: Workflows not working in some Kubernetes clusters](#fixed-workflows-not-working-in-some-kubernetes-clusters)
   - [Fixed a number of bugs in the gRPC Configuration Subscribe API](#fixed-a-number-of-bugs-in-the-grpc-configuration-subscribe-api)
 
+## Security: API token authentication bypass in HTTP endpoints
+
+### Problem
+
+[Security advisory](https://github.com/dapr/dapr/security/advisories/GHSA-59m6-82qm-vqgj)
+
+A high-severity vulnerability has been found in Dapr that allows bypassing [API token authentication](https://docs.dapr.io/operations/security/api-token/), which is used by the Dapr sidecar to authenticate calls coming from the application, with a well-crafted HTTP request.
+
+### Impact
+
+The vulnerability impacts all users on Dapr <=1.10.9 and <=1.11.2 who are using API token authentication.
+
+### Root cause
+
+The Dapr sidecar allowed all requests containing `/healthz` in the URL (including query string) to bypass API token authentication.
+
+### Solution
+
+We have changed the API token authentication middleware to allow bypassing the authentication only for healthcheck endpoints more strictly.
+
 ## Security: Potential DoS in avro dependency (CVE-2023-37475)
 
 ### Problem

@@ -287,12 +287,29 @@ func useAPIAuthentication(next fasthttp.RequestHandler) fasthttp.RequestHandler
 
 	return func(ctx *fasthttp.RequestCtx) {
 		v := ctx.Request.Header.Peek(authConsts.APITokenHeader)
-		if auth.ExcludedRoute(string(ctx.Request.URI().FullURI())) || string(v) == token {
-			ctx.Request.Header.Del(authConsts.APITokenHeader)
-			next(ctx)
-		} else {
+		if string(v) != token && !isRouteExcludedFromAPITokenAuth(string(ctx.Request.Header.Method()), string(ctx.Request.URI().FullURI())) {
 			ctx.Error("invalid api token", http.StatusUnauthorized)
+			return
 		}
+
+		ctx.Request.Header.Del(authConsts.APITokenHeader)
+		next(ctx)
+	}
+}
+
+func isRouteExcludedFromAPITokenAuth(method string, urlString string) bool {
+	u, err := url.Parse(urlString)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	path := strings.Trim(u.Path, "/")
+	switch path {
+	case apiVersionV1 + "/healthz":
+		return method == http.MethodGet
+	case apiVersionV1 + "/healthz/outbound":
+		return method == http.MethodGet
+	default:
+		return false
 	}
 }
 

@@ -15,13 +15,10 @@ package security
 
 import (
 	"os"
-	"strings"
 
 	"github.com/dapr/dapr/pkg/runtime/security/consts"
 )
 
-var excludedRoutes = []string{"/healthz"}
-
 // GetAPIToken returns the value of the api token from an environment variable.
 func GetAPIToken() string {
 	return os.Getenv(consts.APITokenEnvVar)
@@ -31,13 +28,3 @@ func GetAPIToken() string {
 func GetAppToken() string {
 	return os.Getenv(consts.AppAPITokenEnvVar)
 }
-
-// ExcludedRoute returns whether a given route should be excluded from a token check.
-func ExcludedRoute(route string) bool {
-	for _, r := range excludedRoutes {
-		if strings.Contains(route, r) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}

@@ -54,17 +54,3 @@ func TestAppToken(t *testing.T) {
 		assert.Equal(t, "", token)
 	})
 }
-
-func TestExcludedRoute(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Run("healthz route is excluded", func(t *testing.T) {
-		route := "v1.0/healthz"
-		excluded := ExcludedRoute(route)
-		assert.True(t, excluded)
-	})
-
-	t.Run("custom route is not excluded", func(t *testing.T) {
-		route := "v1.0/state"
-		excluded := ExcludedRoute(route)
-		assert.False(t, excluded)
-	})
-}