Governor proposal creation may be blocked by frontrunning in OpenZeppelin
Description
OpenZeppelin Contracts is a library for smart contract development. By frontrunning the creation of a proposal, an attacker can become the proposer and gain the ability to cancel it. The attacker can do this repeatedly to try to prevent a proposal from being proposed at all. This impacts the Governor contract in v4.9.0 only, and the GovernorCompatibilityBravo contract since v4.3.0. This problem has been patched in 4.9.1 by introducing opt-in frontrunning protection. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may submit the proposal creation transaction to an endpoint with frontrunning protection as a workaround.
AI Insight
LLM-synthesized narrative grounded in this CVE's description and references.
Frontrunning proposal creation in OpenZeppelin Governor contracts allows attacker to become proposer and cancel proposals.
Vulnerability
Description The vulnerability affects the Governor contract in OpenZeppelin Contracts v4.9.0 and the GovernorCompatibilityBravo contract since v4.3.0 [1][2]. By frontrunning the creation of a proposal, an attacker can become the proposer and gain the ability to cancel it [1].
Attack
Vector An attacker can monitor the mempool for proposal creation transactions and submit an identical proposal with a higher gas price to have it mined first [1][3]. Once the attacker becomes the proposer, they can cancel the proposal, effectively blocking its progress [3]. This can be repeated to prevent any proposal from being proposed at all [1].
Impact
This is a denial-of-service attack on governance functionality, as it prevents legitimate proposals from being created and voted on [1]. No privileged role is required, only the ability to frontrun transactions on the network [1].
Mitigation
The issue is patched in OpenZeppelin Contracts v4.9.1 [3][4]. The fix introduces opt-in frontrunning protection by allowing proposers to append #proposer=0x... to the proposal description, restricting submission to that specific address [4]. Users unable to upgrade should submit proposal creation transactions to an endpoint with frontrunning protection as a workaround [1].
AI Insight generated on May 20, 2026. Synthesized from this CVE's description and the cited reference URLs; citations are validated against the source bundle.
Affected packages
Versions sourced from the GitHub Security Advisory.
| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
@openzeppelin/contractsnpm | >= 4.3.0, < 4.9.1 | 4.9.1 |
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeablenpm | >= 4.3.0, < 4.9.1 | 4.9.1 |
Affected products
3- ghsa-coords2 versions
>= 4.3.0, < 4.9.1+ 1 more
- (no CPE)range: >= 4.3.0, < 4.9.1
- (no CPE)range: >= 4.3.0, < 4.9.1
- OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contractsv5Range: >=4.3.0, < 4.9.1
Patches
166f390fa516bTranspile 33ff9b08
4 files changed · +231 −2
.changeset/swift-bags-divide.md+5 −0 added@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +--- +'openzeppelin-solidity': patch +--- + +`Governor`: Add a mechanism to restrict the address of the proposer using a suffix in the description.
contracts/governance/GovernorUpgradeable.sol+88 −2 modified@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ abstract contract GovernorUpgradeable is Initializable, ContextUpgradeable, ERC1 } /** - * @dev See {IGovernor-propose}. + * @dev See {IGovernor-propose}. This function has opt-in frontrunning protection, described in {_isValidDescriptionForProposer}. */ function propose( address[] memory targets, @@ -278,8 +278,9 @@ abstract contract GovernorUpgradeable is Initializable, ContextUpgradeable, ERC1 string memory description ) public virtual override returns (uint256) { address proposer = _msgSender(); - uint256 currentTimepoint = clock(); + require(_isValidDescriptionForProposer(proposer, description), "Governor: proposer restricted"); + uint256 currentTimepoint = clock(); require( getVotes(proposer, currentTimepoint - 1) >= proposalThreshold(), "Governor: proposer votes below proposal threshold" @@ -641,6 +642,91 @@ abstract contract GovernorUpgradeable is Initializable, ContextUpgradeable, ERC1 return this.onERC1155BatchReceived.selector; } + /** + * @dev Check if the proposer is authorized to submit a proposal with the given description. + * + * If the proposal description ends with `#proposer=0x???`, where `0x???` is an address written as a hex string + * (case insensitive), then the submission of this proposal will only be authorized to said address. + * + * This is used for frontrunning protection. By adding this pattern at the end of their proposal, one can ensure + * that no other address can submit the same proposal. An attacker would have to either remove or change that part, + * which would result in a different proposal id. + * + * If the description does not match this pattern, it is unrestricted and anyone can submit it. This includes: + * - If the `0x???` part is not a valid hex string. + * - If the `0x???` part is a valid hex string, but does not contain exactly 40 hex digits. + * - If it ends with the expected suffix followed by newlines or other whitespace. + * - If it ends with some other similar suffix, e.g. `#other=abc`. + * - If it does not end with any such suffix. + */ + function _isValidDescriptionForProposer( + address proposer, + string memory description + ) internal view virtual returns (bool) { + uint256 len = bytes(description).length; + + // Length is too short to contain a valid proposer suffix + if (len < 52) { + return true; + } + + // Extract what would be the `#proposer=0x` marker beginning the suffix + bytes12 marker; + assembly { + // - Start of the string contents in memory = description + 32 + // - First character of the marker = len - 52 + // - Length of "#proposer=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" = 52 + // - We read the memory word starting at the first character of the marker: + // - (description + 32) + (len - 52) = description + (len - 20) + // - Note: Solidity will ignore anything past the first 12 bytes + marker := mload(add(description, sub(len, 20))) + } + + // If the marker is not found, there is no proposer suffix to check + if (marker != bytes12("#proposer=0x")) { + return true; + } + + // Parse the 40 characters following the marker as uint160 + uint160 recovered = 0; + for (uint256 i = len - 40; i < len; ++i) { + (bool isHex, uint8 value) = _tryHexToUint(bytes(description)[i]); + // If any of the characters is not a hex digit, ignore the suffix entirely + if (!isHex) { + return true; + } + recovered = (recovered << 4) | value; + } + + return recovered == uint160(proposer); + } + + /** + * @dev Try to parse a character from a string as a hex value. Returns `(true, value)` if the char is in + * `[0-9a-fA-F]` and `(false, 0)` otherwise. Value is guaranteed to be in the range `0 <= value < 16` + */ + function _tryHexToUint(bytes1 char) private pure returns (bool, uint8) { + uint8 c = uint8(char); + unchecked { + // Case 0-9 + if (47 < c && c < 58) { + return (true, c - 48); + } + // Case A-F + else if (64 < c && c < 71) { + return (true, c - 55); + } + // Case a-f + else if (96 < c && c < 103) { + return (true, c - 87); + } + // Else: not a hex char + else { + return (false, 0); + } + } + } + /** * @dev This empty reserved space is put in place to allow future versions to add new * variables without shifting down storage in the inheritance chain.
test/governance/Governor.test.js+83 −0 modified@@ -544,6 +544,89 @@ contract('Governor', function (accounts) { }); }); + describe('frontrun protection using description suffix', function () { + describe('without protection', function () { + describe('without suffix', function () { + it('proposer can propose', async function () { + expectEvent(await this.helper.propose({ from: proposer }), 'ProposalCreated'); + }); + + it('someone else can propose', async function () { + expectEvent(await this.helper.propose({ from: voter1 }), 'ProposalCreated'); + }); + }); + + describe('with different suffix', function () { + beforeEach(async function () { + this.proposal = this.helper.setProposal( + [ + { + target: this.receiver.address, + data: this.receiver.contract.methods.mockFunction().encodeABI(), + value, + }, + ], + `<proposal description>#wrong-suffix=${proposer}`, + ); + }); + + it('proposer can propose', async function () { + expectEvent(await this.helper.propose({ from: proposer }), 'ProposalCreated'); + }); + + it('someone else can propose', async function () { + expectEvent(await this.helper.propose({ from: voter1 }), 'ProposalCreated'); + }); + }); + + describe('with proposer suffix but bad address part', function () { + beforeEach(async function () { + this.proposal = this.helper.setProposal( + [ + { + target: this.receiver.address, + data: this.receiver.contract.methods.mockFunction().encodeABI(), + value, + }, + ], + `<proposal description>#proposer=0x3C44CdDdB6a900fa2b585dd299e03d12FA429XYZ`, // XYZ are not a valid hex char + ); + }); + + it('propose can propose', async function () { + expectEvent(await this.helper.propose({ from: proposer }), 'ProposalCreated'); + }); + + it('someone else can propose', async function () { + expectEvent(await this.helper.propose({ from: voter1 }), 'ProposalCreated'); + }); + }); + }); + + describe('with protection via proposer suffix', function () { + beforeEach(async function () { + this.proposal = this.helper.setProposal( + [ + { + target: this.receiver.address, + data: this.receiver.contract.methods.mockFunction().encodeABI(), + value, + }, + ], + `<proposal description>#proposer=${proposer}`, + ); + }); + + it('proposer can propose', async function () { + expectEvent(await this.helper.propose({ from: proposer }), 'ProposalCreated'); + }); + + it('someone else cannot propose', async function () { + await expectRevert(this.helper.propose({ from: voter1 }), 'Governor: proposer restricted'); + }); + }); + }); + describe('onlyGovernance updates', function () { it('setVotingDelay is protected', async function () { await expectRevert(this.mock.setVotingDelay('0'), 'Governor: onlyGovernance');
test/governance/Governor.t.sol+55 −0 added@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT + +pragma solidity ^0.8.19; + +import "forge-std/Test.sol"; +import "../../contracts/utils/Strings.sol"; +import "../../contracts/governance/Governor.sol"; + +contract GovernorInternalTest is Test, Governor { + constructor() Governor("") {} + + function testValidDescriptionForProposer(string memory description, address proposer, bool includeProposer) public { + if (includeProposer) { + description = string.concat(description, "#proposer=", Strings.toHexString(proposer)); + } + assertTrue(_isValidDescriptionForProposer(proposer, description)); + } + + function testInvalidDescriptionForProposer( + string memory description, + address commitProposer, + address actualProposer + ) public { + vm.assume(commitProposer != actualProposer); + description = string.concat(description, "#proposer=", Strings.toHexString(commitProposer)); + assertFalse(_isValidDescriptionForProposer(actualProposer, description)); + } + + // We don't need to truly implement implement the missing functions because we are just testing + // internal helpers. + + function clock() public pure override returns (uint48) {} + + // solhint-disable-next-line func-name-mixedcase + function CLOCK_MODE() public pure override returns (string memory) {} + + // solhint-disable-next-line func-name-mixedcase + function COUNTING_MODE() public pure virtual override returns (string memory) {} + + function votingDelay() public pure virtual override returns (uint256) {} + + function votingPeriod() public pure virtual override returns (uint256) {} + + function quorum(uint256) public pure virtual override returns (uint256) {} + + function hasVoted(uint256, address) public pure virtual override returns (bool) {} + + function _quorumReached(uint256) internal pure virtual override returns (bool) {} + + function _voteSucceeded(uint256) internal pure virtual override returns (bool) {} + + function _getVotes(address, uint256, bytes memory) internal pure virtual override returns (uint256) {} + + function _countVote(uint256, address, uint8, uint256, bytes memory) internal virtual override {} +}
Vulnerability mechanics
Generated on May 9, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.
References
6- github.com/advisories/GHSA-5h3x-9wvq-w4m2ghsaADVISORY
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34234ghsaADVISORY
- github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts-upgradeable/commit/66f390fa516b550838e2c2f65132b5bc2afe1cedghsaWEB
- github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/commit/d9474327a492f9f310f31bc53f38dbea56ed9a57ghsax_refsource_MISCWEB
- github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/releases/tag/v4.9.1ghsaWEB
- github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/security/advisories/GHSA-5h3x-9wvq-w4m2ghsax_refsource_CONFIRMWEB
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