Missing Authentication for Critical Function in ikus060/rdiffweb
Description
Missing Authentication for Critical Function in GitHub repository ikus060/rdiffweb prior to 2.5.0a6.
AI Insight
LLM-synthesized narrative grounded in this CVE's description and references.
CVE-2022-3327: Missing authentication for a critical function in rdiffweb before 2.5.0a6 allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass session validation.
Vulnerability
Description CVE-2022-3327 is a missing authentication vulnerability in the critical session validation function of rdiffweb, a web-based backup management tool. The flaw exists because the _is_login() method incorrectly returns True even when the session timeout values are not properly checked, effectively allowing requests without a valid login to be treated as authenticated [1][3]. The vulnerability was present in versions prior to 2.5.0a6.
Attack
Vector and Exploitation An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this by sending crafted requests that bypass the session timeout check. Since the session validation logic did not enforce persistent or absolute timeout checks, an attacker with network access to the rdiffweb interface could access protected functions without providing valid credentials [2][3]. No authentication or prior access is required; the attack surface is the web management interface.
Impact
Successful exploitation allows an attacker to access critical functions that should require authentication, potentially including viewing, modifying, or deleting backup repositories, managing users, and other administrative operations [1][4]. The impact is heightened because rdiffweb manages backup data, which often contains sensitive information.
Mitigation
The issue was fixed in commit f2a32f2a9f3fb8be1a9432ac3d81d3aacdb13095, and users should upgrade to rdiffweb version 2.5.0a6 or later [3]. No workaround is available for unpatched versions.
- GitHub - ikus060/rdiffweb: A simplified backup management software for quick access to your archives through an efficient web interface.
- NVD - CVE-2022-3327
- Define idle and absolute session timeout with agressive default to pr… · ikus060/rdiffweb@f2a32f2
- advisory-database/vulns/rdiffweb/PYSEC-2022-42977.yaml at main · pypa/advisory-database
AI Insight generated on May 21, 2026. Synthesized from this CVE's description and the cited reference URLs; citations are validated against the source bundle.
Affected packages
Versions sourced from the GitHub Security Advisory.
| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
rdiffwebPyPI | < 2.5.0 | 2.5.0 |
Affected products
2- ikus060/ikus060/rdiffwebv5Range: unspecified
Patches
1f2a32f2a9f3fDefine idle and absolute session timeout with agressive default to protect usage on public computer
6 files changed · +80 −28
doc/configuration.md+10 −0 modified@@ -162,6 +162,16 @@ Here is an example of how you may limit Rdiffweb access to members of *Admin_Bac ldap-group-attribute=memberUid ldap-group-attribute-is-dn=false +## Configure User Session + +A user session is a sequence of request and response transactions associated with a single user. The user session is the means to track each authenticated user. + +| Option | Description | Example | +| --- | --- | --- | +| session-idle-timeout | This timeout defines the amount of time a session will remain active in case there is no activity in the session. User Session will be revoke after this period of inactivity, unless the user selected "remember me". Default 10 minutes. | 5 | +| session-absolute-timeout | This timeout defines the maximum amount of time a session can be active. After this period, user is forced to (re)authenticate, unless the user selected "remember me". Default 20 minutes. | 30 | +| session-persistent-timeout | This timeout defines the maximum amount of time to remember and trust a user device. This timeout is used when user select "remember me". Default 30 days | 43200 | + ## Configure email notifications Since Rdiffweb v0.9, you may configure Rdiffweb to send an email notification to the users when their backups did not complete successfully for a period of time.
rdiffweb/controller/tests/test_page_login.py+21 −0 modified@@ -108,6 +108,9 @@ def test_login(self, unused, original_url): # Then user is redirected to original URL self.assertStatus('303 See Other') self.assertHeaderItemValue('Location', self.baseurl + original_url) + # Then cookie is not persistent + self.assertNotIn('expires', self.cookies[0][1]) + self.assertNotIn('Max-Age', self.cookies[0][1]) # When requesting the original page self.getPage(original_url) # Then page return without error @@ -177,6 +180,24 @@ def test_login_twice(self): self.assertStatus(200) self.assertInBody(self.USERNAME) + def test_login_persistent(self): + # Given a user authenticated with persistent + self.getPage('/logout/') + self.assertStatus(303) + self.getPage( + '/login/', method='POST', body={'login': self.USERNAME, 'password': self.PASSWORD, 'persistent': '1'} + ) + self.assertStatus(303) + # Then a persistent cookie is return + self.assertIn('expires', self.cookies[0][1]) + self.assertIn('Max-Age', self.cookies[0][1]) + # Then a session is created with persistent flag + session = DbSession(id=self.session_id) + session.load() + self.assertTrue(session['login_persistent']) + # Then session timeout is 30 days in future + self.assertAlmostEqual(session.timeout, 43200, delta=2) + class LoginPageWithWelcomeMsgTest(rdiffweb.test.WebCase):
rdiffweb/core/config.py+18 −11 modified@@ -387,25 +387,32 @@ def get_parser(): ) parser.add( - '--session-timeout', - metavar='MINUTES', - help='Sessions will be revoke after this period of inactivity, unless the user selected "remember me". Default 15 minutes.', - default=15, + '--rate-limit', + metavar='LIMIT', + type=int, + default=20, + help='maximum number of requests per hour that can be made on sensitive endpoints. When this limit is reached, an HTTP 429 message is returned to the user or the user is logged out. This security measure is used to limit brute force attacks on the login page and the RESTful API.', ) parser.add( - '--session-persistent-timeout', + '--session-idle-timeout', metavar='MINUTES', - help='Persistent sessions (remember me) will be revoke after this period of inactivity. Default 30 days.', - default=43200, + help='This timeout defines the amount of time a session will remain active in case there is no activity in the session. User Session will be revoke after this period of inactivity, unless the user selected "remember me". Default 5 minutes.', + default=5, ) parser.add( - '--rate-limit', - metavar='LIMIT', - type=int, + '--session-absolute-timeout', + metavar='MINUTES', + help='This timeout defines the maximum amount of time a session can be active. After this period, user is forced to (re)authenticate, unless the user selected "remember me". Default 20 minutes.', default=20, - help='maximum number of requests per hour that can be made on sensitive endpoints. When this limit is reached, an HTTP 429 message is returned to the user or the user is logged out. This security measure is used to limit brute force attacks on the login page and the RESTful API.', + ) + + parser.add( + '--session-persistent-timeout', + metavar='MINUTES', + help='This timeout defines the maximum amount of time to remember and trust a user device. This timeout is used when user select "remember me". Default 30 days.', + default=43200, ) parser.add(
rdiffweb/rdw_app.py+3 −2 modified@@ -205,9 +205,10 @@ def __init__(self, cfg): 'tools.sessions.debug': cfg.debug, 'tools.sessions.storage_class': DbSession, 'tools.sessions.httponly': True, - 'tools.sessions.timeout': cfg.session_timeout, # minutes + 'tools.sessions.timeout': cfg.session_idle_timeout, # minutes 'tools.sessions.persistent': False, # auth_form should update this. - 'tools.auth_form.timeout': cfg.session_persistent_timeout, # minutes + 'tools.auth_form.persistent_timeout': cfg.session_persistent_timeout, # minutes + 'tools.auth_form.absolute_timeout': cfg.session_absolute_timeout, # minutes 'tools.ratelimit.debug': cfg.debug, 'tools.ratelimit.delay': 3600, 'tools.ratelimit.limit': cfg.rate_limit,
rdiffweb/tools/auth_form.py+27 −15 modified@@ -46,12 +46,9 @@ def _is_login(self): return False # Verify session + # We don't need to verify the timeout value since expired session get deleted automatically. session = cherrypy.session - return ( - session.get(SESSION_KEY) is not None - and session.get(LOGIN_TIME) is not None - and session[LOGIN_TIME] + datetime.timedelta(minutes=session.timeout) > session.now() - ) + return session.get(SESSION_KEY) is not None and session.get(LOGIN_TIME) is not None def _get_redirect_url(self): """ @@ -68,11 +65,32 @@ def _set_redirect_url(self): new_url = cherrypy.url(original_url, qs=qs, base='') cherrypy.session[LOGIN_REDIRECT_URL] = new_url + def _update_session_timeout(self, persistent_timeout=43200, absolute_timeout=30): + """ + Since we have multiple timeout value (idle, absolute and persistent) We need to update the session timeout and possibly the cookie timeout. + """ + persistent_timeout = cherrypy.request.config.get('tools.auth_form.persistent_timeout', 43200) + absolute_timeout = cherrypy.request.config.get('tools.auth_form.absolute_timeout', 30) + # If login is persistent, update the cookie max-age/expires + session = cherrypy.session + if session.get(LOGIN_PERSISTENT, False): + expiration = session[LOGIN_TIME] + datetime.timedelta(minutes=persistent_timeout) + session.timeout = int((expiration - session.now()).total_seconds() / 60) + cookie = cherrypy.serving.response.cookie + cookie['session_id']['max-age'] = session.timeout * 60 + cookie['session_id']['expires'] = httputil.HTTPDate(time.time() + session.timeout * 60) + else: + session_idle_timeout = cherrypy.request.config.get('tools.sessions.timeout', 60) + expiration1 = session.now() + datetime.timedelta(minutes=session_idle_timeout) + expiration2 = session[LOGIN_TIME] + datetime.timedelta(minutes=absolute_timeout) + expiration = min(expiration1, expiration2) + session.timeout = int((expiration - session.now()).total_seconds() / 60) + def redirect_to_original_url(self): # Redirect user to original URL raise cherrypy.HTTPRedirect(self._get_redirect_url()) - def run(self, login_url='/login/', logout_url='/logout', timeout=43200): + def run(self, login_url='/login/', logout_url='/logout', persistent_timeout=43200, absolute_timeout=30): """ A tool that verify if the session is associated to a user by tracking a session key. If session is not authenticated, redirect user to login page. @@ -96,15 +114,7 @@ def run(self, login_url='/login/', logout_url='/logout', timeout=43200): # And redirect to login page raise cherrypy.HTTPRedirect(login_url) - # If login is persistent, update the cookie max-age/expires - if cherrypy.session.get(LOGIN_PERSISTENT, False): - cherrypy.session.timeout = timeout - cookie = cherrypy.serving.response.cookie - cookie['session_id']['max-age'] = timeout * 60 - cookie['session_id']['expires'] = httputil.HTTPDate(time.time() + timeout * 60) - else: - session_timeout = cherrypy.request.config.get('tools.sessions.timeout', 60) - cherrypy.session.timeout = session_timeout + self._update_session_timeout() def login(self, username, persistent=False): """ @@ -116,6 +126,8 @@ def login(self, username, persistent=False): cherrypy.session[LOGIN_TIME] = cherrypy.session.now() # Generate a new session id cherrypy.session.regenerate() + # Update the session timeout + self._update_session_timeout() def logout(self): # Clear session date and generate a new session id
README.md+1 −0 modified@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ This next release focus on two-factor-authentication as a measure to increase se * Enforce password policy new password cannot be set as new password [CVE-2022-3376](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-3376) * Enforce better rate limit on login, mfa, password change and API [CVE-2022-3439](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-3439) [CVE-2022-3456](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-3456) * Enforce 'Origin' validation [CVE-2022-3457](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-3457) +* Define idle and absolute session timeout with agressive default to protect usage on public computer [CVE-2022-3327](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-3327) Breaking changes:
Vulnerability mechanics
Generated on May 9, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.
References
5- github.com/advisories/GHSA-99j5-fvg3-54pmghsaADVISORY
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-3327ghsaADVISORY
- github.com/ikus060/rdiffweb/commit/f2a32f2a9f3fb8be1a9432ac3d81d3aacdb13095ghsaWEB
- github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/rdiffweb/PYSEC-2022-42977.yamlghsaWEB
- huntr.dev/bounties/02207c8f-2b15-4a31-a86a-74fd2fca0ed1ghsaWEB
News mentions
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