Improper Certificate Validation in Cosign
Description
Cosign provides container signing, verification, and storage in an OCI registry for the sigstore project. Prior to version 1.5.2, Cosign can be manipulated to claim that an entry for a signature exists in the Rekor transparency log even if it doesn't. This requires the attacker to have pull and push permissions for the signature in OCI. This can happen with both standard signing with a keypair and "keyless signing" with Fulcio. If an attacker has access to the signature in OCI, they can manipulate cosign into believing the entry was stored in Rekor even though it wasn't. The vulnerability has been patched in v1.5.2 of Cosign. The signature in the signedEntryTimestamp provided by Rekor is now compared to the signature that is being verified. If these don't match, then an error is returned. If a valid bundle is copied to a different signature, verification should fail. Cosign output now only informs the user that certificates were verified if a certificate was in fact verified. There is currently no known workaround.
Affected packages
Versions sourced from the GitHub Security Advisory.
| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
github.com/sigstore/cosignGo | < 1.5.2 | 1.5.2 |
Affected products
1Patches
196d410a6580eMerge pull request from GHSA-ccxc-vr6p-4858
6 files changed · +226 −6
cmd/cosign/cli/verify/verify_attestation.go+8 −1 modified@@ -127,6 +127,13 @@ func (c *VerifyAttestationCommand) Exec(ctx context.Context, images []string) (e } } + // NB: There are only 2 kinds of verification right now: + // 1. You gave us the public key explicitly to verify against so co.SigVerifier is non-nil or, + // 2. We're going to find an x509 certificate on the signature and verify against Fulcio root trust + // TODO(nsmith5): Refactor this verification logic to pass back _how_ verification + // was performed so we don't need to use this fragile logic here. + fulcioVerified := (co.SigVerifier == nil) + for _, imageRef := range images { var verified []oci.Signature var bundleVerified bool @@ -267,7 +274,7 @@ func (c *VerifyAttestationCommand) Exec(ctx context.Context, images []string) (e } // TODO: add CUE validation report to `PrintVerificationHeader`. - PrintVerificationHeader(imageRef, co, bundleVerified) + PrintVerificationHeader(imageRef, co, bundleVerified, fulcioVerified) // The attestations are always JSON, so use the raw "text" mode for outputting them instead of conversion PrintVerification(imageRef, verified, "text") }
cmd/cosign/cli/verify/verify.go+13 −4 modified@@ -146,13 +146,20 @@ func (c *VerifyCommand) Exec(ctx context.Context, images []string) (err error) { } co.SigVerifier = pubKey + // NB: There are only 2 kinds of verification right now: + // 1. You gave us the public key explicitly to verify against so co.SigVerifier is non-nil or, + // 2. We're going to find an x509 certificate on the signature and verify against Fulcio root trust + // TODO(nsmith5): Refactor this verification logic to pass back _how_ verification + // was performed so we don't need to use this fragile logic here. + fulcioVerified := (co.SigVerifier == nil) + for _, img := range images { if c.LocalImage { verified, bundleVerified, err := cosign.VerifyLocalImageSignatures(ctx, img, co) if err != nil { return err } - PrintVerificationHeader(img, co, bundleVerified) + PrintVerificationHeader(img, co, bundleVerified, fulcioVerified) PrintVerification(img, verified, c.Output) } else { ref, err := name.ParseReference(img) @@ -169,15 +176,15 @@ func (c *VerifyCommand) Exec(ctx context.Context, images []string) (err error) { return err } - PrintVerificationHeader(ref.Name(), co, bundleVerified) + PrintVerificationHeader(ref.Name(), co, bundleVerified, fulcioVerified) PrintVerification(ref.Name(), verified, c.Output) } } return nil } -func PrintVerificationHeader(imgRef string, co *cosign.CheckOpts, bundleVerified bool) { +func PrintVerificationHeader(imgRef string, co *cosign.CheckOpts, bundleVerified, fulcioVerified bool) { fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "\nVerification for %s --\n", imgRef) fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "The following checks were performed on each of these signatures:") if co.ClaimVerifier != nil { @@ -195,7 +202,9 @@ func PrintVerificationHeader(imgRef string, co *cosign.CheckOpts, bundleVerified if co.SigVerifier != nil { fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, " - The signatures were verified against the specified public key") } - fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, " - Any certificates were verified against the Fulcio roots.") + if fulcioVerified { + fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, " - Any certificates were verified against the Fulcio roots.") + } } // PrintVerification logs details about the verification to stdout
pkg/cosign/verify.go+67 −0 modified@@ -586,6 +586,10 @@ func VerifyBundle(ctx context.Context, sig oci.Signature) (bool, error) { return false, nil } + if err := compareSigs(bundle.Payload.Body.(string), sig); err != nil { + return false, err + } + publicKeys, err := GetRekorPubs(ctx) if err != nil { return false, errors.Wrap(err, "retrieving rekor public key") @@ -637,6 +641,31 @@ func VerifyBundle(ctx context.Context, sig oci.Signature) (bool, error) { return true, nil } +// compare bundle signature to the signature we are verifying +func compareSigs(bundleBody string, sig oci.Signature) error { + // TODO(nsmith5): modify function signature to make it more clear _why_ + // we've returned nil (there are several reasons possible here). + actualSig, err := sig.Base64Signature() + if err != nil { + return errors.Wrap(err, "base64 signature") + } + if actualSig == "" { + // NB: empty sig means this is an attestation + return nil + } + bundleSignature, err := bundleSig(bundleBody) + if err != nil { + return errors.Wrap(err, "failed to extract signature from bundle") + } + if bundleSignature == "" { + return nil + } + if bundleSignature != actualSig { + return fmt.Errorf("signature in bundle does not match signature being verified") + } + return nil +} + func bundleHash(bundleBody, signature string) (string, string, error) { var toto models.Intoto var rekord models.Rekord @@ -698,6 +727,44 @@ func bundleHash(bundleBody, signature string) (string, string, error) { return *hrekordObj.Data.Hash.Algorithm, *hrekordObj.Data.Hash.Value, nil } +// bundleSig extracts the signature from the rekor bundle body +func bundleSig(bundleBody string) (string, error) { + var rekord models.Rekord + var hrekord models.Hashedrekord + var rekordObj models.RekordV001Schema + var hrekordObj models.HashedrekordV001Schema + + bodyDecoded, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(bundleBody) + if err != nil { + return "", errors.Wrap(err, "decoding bundleBody") + } + + // Try Rekord + if err := json.Unmarshal(bodyDecoded, &rekord); err == nil { + specMarshal, err := json.Marshal(rekord.Spec) + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + if err := json.Unmarshal(specMarshal, &rekordObj); err != nil { + return "", err + } + return rekordObj.Signature.Content.String(), nil + } + + // Try hashedRekordObj + if err := json.Unmarshal(bodyDecoded, &hrekord); err != nil { + return "", err + } + specMarshal, err := json.Marshal(hrekord.Spec) + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + if err := json.Unmarshal(specMarshal, &hrekordObj); err != nil { + return "", err + } + return hrekordObj.Signature.Content.String(), nil +} + func VerifySET(bundlePayload cbundle.RekorPayload, signature []byte, pub *ecdsa.PublicKey) error { contents, err := json.Marshal(bundlePayload) if err != nil {
pkg/cosign/verify_test.go+38 −0 modified@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ import ( "github.com/in-toto/in-toto-golang/in_toto" "github.com/pkg/errors" "github.com/secure-systems-lab/go-securesystemslib/dsse" + "github.com/sigstore/cosign/pkg/oci/static" "github.com/sigstore/cosign/pkg/types" "github.com/sigstore/cosign/test" "github.com/sigstore/sigstore/pkg/signature" @@ -196,3 +197,40 @@ func TestValidateAndUnpackCertInvalidEmail(t *testing.T) { _, err := ValidateAndUnpackCert(leafCert, co) require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "expected email not found in certificate") } + +func TestCompareSigs(t *testing.T) { + //TODO(nsmith5): Add test cases for invalid signature, missing signature etc + tests := []struct { + description string + b64sig string + bundleBody string + shouldErr bool + }{ + { + description: "sigs match", + b64sig: "MEQCIDO3XHbLovPWK+bk8ItCig2cwlr/8MXbLvz3UFzxMGIMAiA1lqdM9IqqUvCUqzOjufTq3sKU3qSn7R5tPqPz0ddNwQ==", + bundleBody: `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`, + }, + { + description: "sigs don't match", + b64sig: "bm9wZQo=", + bundleBody: `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`, + shouldErr: true, + }, + } + for _, test := range tests { + t.Run(test.description, func(t *testing.T) { + sig, err := static.NewSignature([]byte("payload"), test.b64sig) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("failed to create static signature: %v", err) + } + err = compareSigs(test.bundleBody, sig) + if err == nil && test.shouldErr { + t.Fatal("test should have errored") + } + if err != nil && !test.shouldErr { + t.Fatal(err) + } + }) + } +}
pkg/sget/sget.go+8 −1 modified@@ -83,13 +83,20 @@ func (sg *SecureGet) Do(ctx context.Context) error { } if co.SigVerifier != nil || options.EnableExperimental() { + // NB: There are only 2 kinds of verification right now: + // 1. You gave us the public key explicitly to verify against so co.SigVerifier is non-nil or, + // 2. We're going to find an x509 certificate on the signature and verify against Fulcio root trust + // TODO(nsmith5): Refactor this verification logic to pass back _how_ verification + // was performed so we don't need to use this fragile logic here. + fulcioVerified := (co.SigVerifier == nil) + co.RootCerts = fulcio.GetRoots() sp, bundleVerified, err := cosign.VerifyImageSignatures(ctx, ref, co) if err != nil { return err } - verify.PrintVerificationHeader(sg.ImageRef, co, bundleVerified) + verify.PrintVerificationHeader(sg.ImageRef, co, bundleVerified, fulcioVerified) verify.PrintVerification(sg.ImageRef, sp, "text") }
test/e2e_test.go+92 −0 modified@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ import ( "github.com/sigstore/cosign/pkg/cosign" "github.com/sigstore/cosign/pkg/cosign/kubernetes" cremote "github.com/sigstore/cosign/pkg/cosign/remote" + "github.com/sigstore/cosign/pkg/oci/mutate" ociremote "github.com/sigstore/cosign/pkg/oci/remote" "github.com/sigstore/cosign/pkg/sget" sigs "github.com/sigstore/cosign/pkg/signature" @@ -1156,3 +1157,94 @@ func registryClientOpts(ctx context.Context) []remote.Option { remote.WithContext(ctx), } } + +// If a signature has a bundle, but *not for that signature*, cosign verification should fail +// This test is pretty long, so here are the basic points: +// 1. Sign image1 with a keypair, store entry in rekor +// 2. Sign image2 with keypair, DO NOT store entry in rekor +// 3. Take the bundle from image1 and store it on the signature in image2 +// 4. Verification of image2 should now fail, since the bundle is for a different signature +func TestInvalidBundle(t *testing.T) { + regName, stop := reg(t) + defer stop() + td := t.TempDir() + + img1 := path.Join(regName, "cosign-e2e") + + imgRef, _, cleanup := mkimage(t, img1) + defer cleanup() + + _, privKeyPath, pubKeyPath := keypair(t, td) + + ctx := context.Background() + + // Sign image1 and store the entry in rekor + // (we're just using it for its bundle) + defer setenv(t, options.ExperimentalEnv, "1")() + remoteOpts := ociremote.WithRemoteOptions(registryClientOpts(ctx)...) + ko := sign.KeyOpts{KeyRef: privKeyPath, PassFunc: passFunc, RekorURL: rekorURL} + regOpts := options.RegistryOptions{} + + must(sign.SignCmd(ro, ko, regOpts, nil, []string{img1}, "", true, "", "", "", true, false, ""), t) + // verify image1 + must(verify(pubKeyPath, img1, true, nil, ""), t) + // extract the bundle from image1 + si, err := ociremote.SignedImage(imgRef, remoteOpts) + must(err, t) + imgSigs, err := si.Signatures() + must(err, t) + sigs, err := imgSigs.Get() + must(err, t) + if l := len(sigs); l != 1 { + t.Error("expected one signature") + } + bund, err := sigs[0].Bundle() + must(err, t) + if bund == nil { + t.Fail() + } + + // Now, we move on to image2 + // Sign image2 and DO NOT store the entry in rekor + defer setenv(t, options.ExperimentalEnv, "0")() + img2 := path.Join(regName, "unrelated") + imgRef2, _, cleanup := mkimage(t, img2) + defer cleanup() + must(sign.SignCmd(ro, ko, regOpts, nil, []string{img2}, "", true, "", "", "", false, false, ""), t) + must(verify(pubKeyPath, img2, true, nil, ""), t) + + si2, err := ociremote.SignedEntity(imgRef2, remoteOpts) + must(err, t) + sigs2, err := si2.Signatures() + must(err, t) + gottenSigs2, err := sigs2.Get() + must(err, t) + if len(gottenSigs2) != 1 { + t.Fatal("there should be one signature") + } + sigsTag, err := ociremote.SignatureTag(imgRef2) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + // At this point, we would mutate the signature to add the bundle annotation + // since we don't have a function for it at the moment, mock this by deleting the signature + // and pushing a new signature with the additional bundle annotation + if err := remote.Delete(sigsTag); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + mustErr(verify(pubKeyPath, img2, true, nil, ""), t) + + newSig, err := mutate.Signature(gottenSigs2[0], mutate.WithBundle(bund)) + must(err, t) + si2, err = ociremote.SignedEntity(imgRef2, remoteOpts) + must(err, t) + newImage, err := mutate.AttachSignatureToEntity(si2, newSig) + must(err, t) + if err := ociremote.WriteSignatures(sigsTag.Repository, newImage); err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } + + // veriyfing image2 now should fail + mustErr(verify(pubKeyPath, img2, true, nil, ""), t) +}
Vulnerability mechanics
Generated by null/stub on May 9, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.
References
5- github.com/advisories/GHSA-ccxc-vr6p-4858ghsaADVISORY
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-23649ghsaADVISORY
- github.com/sigstore/cosign/commit/96d410a6580e4e81d24d112a0855c70ca3fb5b49ghsax_refsource_MISCWEB
- github.com/sigstore/cosign/releases/tag/v1.5.2ghsaWEB
- github.com/sigstore/cosign/security/advisories/GHSA-ccxc-vr6p-4858ghsax_refsource_CONFIRMWEB
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