Denial of service in Matrix Synapse
Description
Synapse is a Matrix reference homeserver written in python (pypi package matrix-synapse). Matrix is an ecosystem for open federated Instant Messaging and VoIP. In Synapse before version 1.33.2 "Push rules" can specify conditions under which they will match, including event_match, which matches event content against a pattern including wildcards. Certain patterns can cause very poor performance in the matching engine, leading to a denial-of-service when processing moderate length events. The issue is patched in version 1.33.2. A potential workaround might be to prevent users from making custom push rules, by blocking such requests at a reverse-proxy.
AI Insight
LLM-synthesized narrative grounded in this CVE's description and references.
In Synapse <1.33.2, crafted push rule patterns cause catastrophic backtracking, leading to denial-of-service when processing moderate-length events.
Vulnerability
In Synapse before version 1.33.2, the event_match condition in push rules uses a pattern-matching engine that can suffer from catastrophic backtracking when certain wildcard patterns are provided. This allows an attacker to craft a push rule with a pattern (e.g., containing ? and * wildcards) that causes very poor performance when the server evaluates it against event content of moderate length. The issue is present in the push rule evaluator, specifically in the event_match handling within synapse.push.push_rule_evaluator [1][3].
Exploitation
An attacker needs to be able to create custom push rules on the homeserver, which is a normal user-level action in Matrix. The attacker creates a push rule with a malicious pattern designed to trigger exponential backtracking in the regex-like matching engine. When the server processes an event (e.g., a message) whose content matches the attacker's pattern in a way that causes the engine to explore many matching paths, CPU usage spikes, leading to denial-of-service for the homeserver [1]. No special network position or authentication beyond a valid user account is required.
Impact
Successful exploitation results in denial-of-service (DoS) against the Synapse homeserver, making it unresponsive or slow to process legitimate events. The impact is limited to CPU exhaustion; there is no evidence of information disclosure, privilege escalation, or remote code execution. The attack requires only a valid user account and can be repeated to maintain DoS [1].
Mitigation
The issue is patched in Synapse version 1.33.2, released May 11, 2021 [1][4]. Administrators should upgrade to this version or later. If upgrade is not immediately possible, a workaround is to prevent users from making custom push rules by blocking such requests at a reverse proxy, though this limits normal functionality [1].
AI Insight generated on May 21, 2026. Synthesized from this CVE's description and the cited reference URLs; citations are validated against the source bundle.
Affected packages
Versions sourced from the GitHub Security Advisory.
| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
matrix-synapsePyPI | < 1.33.2 | 1.33.2 |
Affected products
3- ghsa-coords2 versions
< 1.33.2+ 1 more
- (no CPE)range: < 1.33.2
- (no CPE)range: < 1.43.0-1.1
- matrix-org/synapsev5Range: < 1.33.2
Patches
103318a766cacMerge pull request from GHSA-x345-32rc-8h85
6 files changed · +296 −68
synapse/config/tls.py+2 −2 modified@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ import warnings from datetime import datetime from hashlib import sha256 -from typing import List, Optional +from typing import List, Optional, Pattern from unpaddedbase64 import encode_base64 @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ def read_config(self, config: dict, config_dir_path: str, **kwargs): fed_whitelist_entries = [] # Support globs (*) in whitelist values - self.federation_certificate_verification_whitelist = [] # type: List[str] + self.federation_certificate_verification_whitelist = [] # type: List[Pattern] for entry in fed_whitelist_entries: try: entry_regex = glob_to_regex(entry.encode("ascii").decode("ascii"))
synapse/push/push_rule_evaluator.py+3 −52 modified@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ from synapse.events import EventBase from synapse.types import UserID +from synapse.util import glob_to_regex, re_word_boundary from synapse.util.caches.lrucache import LruCache logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) @@ -183,7 +184,7 @@ def _contains_display_name(self, display_name: str) -> bool: r = regex_cache.get((display_name, False, True), None) if not r: r1 = re.escape(display_name) - r1 = _re_word_boundary(r1) + r1 = re_word_boundary(r1) r = re.compile(r1, flags=re.IGNORECASE) regex_cache[(display_name, False, True)] = r @@ -212,64 +213,14 @@ def _glob_matches(glob: str, value: str, word_boundary: bool = False) -> bool: try: r = regex_cache.get((glob, True, word_boundary), None) if not r: - r = _glob_to_re(glob, word_boundary) + r = glob_to_regex(glob, word_boundary) regex_cache[(glob, True, word_boundary)] = r return bool(r.search(value)) except re.error: logger.warning("Failed to parse glob to regex: %r", glob) return False -def _glob_to_re(glob: str, word_boundary: bool) -> Pattern: - """Generates regex for a given glob. - - Args: - glob - word_boundary: Whether to match against word boundaries or entire string. - """ - if IS_GLOB.search(glob): - r = re.escape(glob) - - r = r.replace(r"\*", ".*?") - r = r.replace(r"\?", ".") - - # handle [abc], [a-z] and [!a-z] style ranges. - r = GLOB_REGEX.sub( - lambda x: ( - "[%s%s]" % (x.group(1) and "^" or "", x.group(2).replace(r"\\\-", "-")) - ), - r, - ) - if word_boundary: - r = _re_word_boundary(r) - - return re.compile(r, flags=re.IGNORECASE) - else: - r = "^" + r + "$" - - return re.compile(r, flags=re.IGNORECASE) - elif word_boundary: - r = re.escape(glob) - r = _re_word_boundary(r) - - return re.compile(r, flags=re.IGNORECASE) - else: - r = "^" + re.escape(glob) + "$" - return re.compile(r, flags=re.IGNORECASE) - - -def _re_word_boundary(r: str) -> str: - """ - Adds word boundary characters to the start and end of an - expression to require that the match occur as a whole word, - but do so respecting the fact that strings starting or ending - with non-word characters will change word boundaries. - """ - # we can't use \b as it chokes on unicode. however \W seems to be okay - # as shorthand for [^0-9A-Za-z_]. - return r"(^|\W)%s(\W|$)" % (r,) - - def _flatten_dict( d: Union[EventBase, dict], prefix: Optional[List[str]] = None,
synapse/util/__init__.py+47 −14 modified@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import json import logging import re +from typing import Pattern import attr from frozendict import frozendict @@ -26,6 +27,9 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) +_WILDCARD_RUN = re.compile(r"([\?\*]+)") + + def _reject_invalid_json(val): """Do not allow Infinity, -Infinity, or NaN values in JSON.""" raise ValueError("Invalid JSON value: '%s'" % val) @@ -158,25 +162,54 @@ def log_failure(failure, msg, consumeErrors=True): return failure -def glob_to_regex(glob): +def glob_to_regex(glob: str, word_boundary: bool = False) -> Pattern: """Converts a glob to a compiled regex object. - The regex is anchored at the beginning and end of the string. - Args: - glob (str) + glob: pattern to match + word_boundary: If True, the pattern will be allowed to match at word boundaries + anywhere in the string. Otherwise, the pattern is anchored at the start and + end of the string. Returns: - re.RegexObject + compiled regex pattern """ - res = "" - for c in glob: - if c == "*": - res = res + ".*" - elif c == "?": - res = res + "." + + # Patterns with wildcards must be simplified to avoid performance cliffs + # - The glob `?**?**?` is equivalent to the glob `???*` + # - The glob `???*` is equivalent to the regex `.{3,}` + chunks = [] + for chunk in _WILDCARD_RUN.split(glob): + # No wildcards? re.escape() + if not _WILDCARD_RUN.match(chunk): + chunks.append(re.escape(chunk)) + continue + + # Wildcards? Simplify. + qmarks = chunk.count("?") + if "*" in chunk: + chunks.append(".{%d,}" % qmarks) else: - res = res + re.escape(c) + chunks.append(".{%d}" % qmarks) + + res = "".join(chunks) - # \A anchors at start of string, \Z at end of string - return re.compile(r"\A" + res + r"\Z", re.IGNORECASE) + if word_boundary: + res = re_word_boundary(res) + else: + # \A anchors at start of string, \Z at end of string + res = r"\A" + res + r"\Z" + + return re.compile(res, re.IGNORECASE) + + +def re_word_boundary(r: str) -> str: + """ + Adds word boundary characters to the start and end of an + expression to require that the match occur as a whole word, + but do so respecting the fact that strings starting or ending + with non-word characters will change word boundaries. + """ + # we can't use \b as it chokes on unicode. however \W seems to be okay + # as shorthand for [^0-9A-Za-z_]. + return r"(^|\W)%s(\W|$)" % (r,)
tests/federation/test_federation_server.py+19 −0 modified@@ -74,6 +74,25 @@ def test_block_ip_literals(self): self.assertFalse(server_matches_acl_event("[1:2::]", e)) self.assertTrue(server_matches_acl_event("1:2:3:4", e)) + def test_wildcard_matching(self): + e = _create_acl_event({"allow": ["good*.com"]}) + self.assertTrue( + server_matches_acl_event("good.com", e), + "* matches 0 characters", + ) + self.assertTrue( + server_matches_acl_event("GOOD.COM", e), + "pattern is case-insensitive", + ) + self.assertTrue( + server_matches_acl_event("good.aa.com", e), + "* matches several characters, including '.'", + ) + self.assertFalse( + server_matches_acl_event("ishgood.com", e), + "pattern does not allow prefixes", + ) + class StateQueryTests(unittest.FederatingHomeserverTestCase):
tests/push/test_push_rule_evaluator.py+166 −0 modified@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ # See the License for the specific language governing permissions and # limitations under the License. +from typing import Any, Dict + from synapse.api.room_versions import RoomVersions from synapse.events import FrozenEvent from synapse.push import push_rule_evaluator @@ -66,6 +68,170 @@ def test_display_name(self): # A display name with spaces should work fine. self.assertTrue(evaluator.matches(condition, "@user:test", "foo bar")) + def _assert_matches( + self, condition: Dict[str, Any], content: Dict[str, Any], msg=None + ) -> None: + evaluator = self._get_evaluator(content) + self.assertTrue(evaluator.matches(condition, "@user:test", "display_name"), msg) + + def _assert_not_matches( + self, condition: Dict[str, Any], content: Dict[str, Any], msg=None + ) -> None: + evaluator = self._get_evaluator(content) + self.assertFalse( + evaluator.matches(condition, "@user:test", "display_name"), msg + ) + + def test_event_match_body(self): + """Check that event_match conditions on content.body work as expected""" + + # if the key is `content.body`, the pattern matches substrings. + + # non-wildcards should match + condition = { + "kind": "event_match", + "key": "content.body", + "pattern": "foobaz", + } + self._assert_matches( + condition, + {"body": "aaa FoobaZ zzz"}, + "patterns should match and be case-insensitive", + ) + self._assert_not_matches( + condition, + {"body": "aa xFoobaZ yy"}, + "pattern should only match at word boundaries", + ) + self._assert_not_matches( + condition, + {"body": "aa foobazx yy"}, + "pattern should only match at word boundaries", + ) + + # wildcards should match + condition = { + "kind": "event_match", + "key": "content.body", + "pattern": "f?o*baz", + } + + self._assert_matches( + condition, + {"body": "aaa FoobarbaZ zzz"}, + "* should match string and pattern should be case-insensitive", + ) + self._assert_matches( + condition, {"body": "aa foobaz yy"}, "* should match 0 characters" + ) + self._assert_not_matches( + condition, {"body": "aa fobbaz yy"}, "? should not match 0 characters" + ) + self._assert_not_matches( + condition, {"body": "aa fiiobaz yy"}, "? should not match 2 characters" + ) + self._assert_not_matches( + condition, + {"body": "aa xfooxbaz yy"}, + "pattern should only match at word boundaries", + ) + self._assert_not_matches( + condition, + {"body": "aa fooxbazx yy"}, + "pattern should only match at word boundaries", + ) + + # test backslashes + condition = { + "kind": "event_match", + "key": "content.body", + "pattern": r"f\oobaz", + } + self._assert_matches( + condition, + {"body": r"F\oobaz"}, + "backslash should match itself", + ) + condition = { + "kind": "event_match", + "key": "content.body", + "pattern": r"f\?obaz", + } + self._assert_matches( + condition, + {"body": r"F\oobaz"}, + r"? after \ should match any character", + ) + + def test_event_match_non_body(self): + """Check that event_match conditions on other keys work as expected""" + + # if the key is anything other than 'content.body', the pattern must match the + # whole value. + + # non-wildcards should match + condition = { + "kind": "event_match", + "key": "content.value", + "pattern": "foobaz", + } + self._assert_matches( + condition, + {"value": "FoobaZ"}, + "patterns should match and be case-insensitive", + ) + self._assert_not_matches( + condition, + {"value": "xFoobaZ"}, + "pattern should only match at the start/end of the value", + ) + self._assert_not_matches( + condition, + {"value": "FoobaZz"}, + "pattern should only match at the start/end of the value", + ) + + # wildcards should match + condition = { + "kind": "event_match", + "key": "content.value", + "pattern": "f?o*baz", + } + self._assert_matches( + condition, + {"value": "FoobarbaZ"}, + "* should match string and pattern should be case-insensitive", + ) + self._assert_matches( + condition, {"value": "foobaz"}, "* should match 0 characters" + ) + self._assert_not_matches( + condition, {"value": "fobbaz"}, "? should not match 0 characters" + ) + self._assert_not_matches( + condition, {"value": "fiiobaz"}, "? should not match 2 characters" + ) + self._assert_not_matches( + condition, + {"value": "xfooxbaz"}, + "pattern should only match at the start/end of the value", + ) + self._assert_not_matches( + condition, + {"value": "fooxbazx"}, + "pattern should only match at the start/end of the value", + ) + self._assert_not_matches( + condition, + {"value": "x\nfooxbaz"}, + "pattern should not match after a newline", + ) + self._assert_not_matches( + condition, + {"value": "fooxbaz\nx"}, + "pattern should not match before a newline", + ) + def test_no_body(self): """Not having a body shouldn't break the evaluator.""" evaluator = self._get_evaluator({})
tests/util/test_glob_to_regex.py+59 −0 added@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +# Copyright 2021 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C. +# +# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); +# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. +# You may obtain a copy of the License at +# +# http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 +# +# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software +# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, +# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. +# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and +# limitations under the License. +from synapse.util import glob_to_regex + +from tests.unittest import TestCase + + +class GlobToRegexTestCase(TestCase): + def test_literal_match(self): + """patterns without wildcards should match""" + pat = glob_to_regex("foobaz") + self.assertTrue( + pat.match("FoobaZ"), "patterns should match and be case-insensitive" + ) + self.assertFalse( + pat.match("x foobaz"), "pattern should not match at word boundaries" + ) + + def test_wildcard_match(self): + pat = glob_to_regex("f?o*baz") + + self.assertTrue( + pat.match("FoobarbaZ"), + "* should match string and pattern should be case-insensitive", + ) + self.assertTrue(pat.match("foobaz"), "* should match 0 characters") + self.assertFalse(pat.match("fooxaz"), "the character after * must match") + self.assertFalse(pat.match("fobbaz"), "? should not match 0 characters") + self.assertFalse(pat.match("fiiobaz"), "? should not match 2 characters") + + def test_multi_wildcard(self): + """patterns with multiple wildcards in a row should match""" + pat = glob_to_regex("**baz") + self.assertTrue(pat.match("agsgsbaz"), "** should match any string") + self.assertTrue(pat.match("baz"), "** should match the empty string") + self.assertEqual(pat.pattern, r"\A.{0,}baz\Z") + + pat = glob_to_regex("*?baz") + self.assertTrue(pat.match("agsgsbaz"), "*? should match any string") + self.assertTrue(pat.match("abaz"), "*? should match a single char") + self.assertFalse(pat.match("baz"), "*? should not match the empty string") + self.assertEqual(pat.pattern, r"\A.{1,}baz\Z") + + pat = glob_to_regex("a?*?*?baz") + self.assertTrue(pat.match("a g baz"), "?*?*? should match 3 chars") + self.assertFalse(pat.match("a..baz"), "?*?*? should not match 2 chars") + self.assertTrue(pat.match("a.gg.baz"), "?*?*? should match 4 chars") + self.assertEqual(pat.pattern, r"\Aa.{3,}baz\Z")
Vulnerability mechanics
Generated on May 9, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.
References
8- github.com/advisories/GHSA-x345-32rc-8h85ghsaADVISORY
- lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/TNNAJOZNMVMXM6AS7RFFKB4QLUJ4IFEY/mitrevendor-advisoryx_refsource_FEDORA
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-29471ghsaADVISORY
- github.com/matrix-org/synapse/commit/03318a766cac9f8b053db2214d9c332a977d226cghsax_refsource_MISCWEB
- github.com/matrix-org/synapse/releases/tag/v1.33.2ghsax_refsource_MISCWEB
- github.com/matrix-org/synapse/security/advisories/GHSA-x345-32rc-8h85ghsax_refsource_CONFIRMWEB
- github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/matrix-synapse/PYSEC-2021-135.yamlghsaWEB
- lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/TNNAJOZNMVMXM6AS7RFFKB4QLUJ4IFEYghsaWEB
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