VYPR
Unrated severityNVD Advisory· Published Apr 27, 2021· Updated Aug 5, 2024

CVE-2019-25040

CVE-2019-25040

Description

Unbound before 1.9.5 allows an infinite loop via a compressed name in dname_pkt_copy. NOTE: The vendor disputes that this is a vulnerability. Although the code may be vulnerable, a running Unbound installation cannot be remotely or locally exploited

Affected products

23

Patches

1
34e52a4313d5

Fix CVE-2019-18934, shell execution in ipsecmod.

https://github.com/NLnetLabs/unboundW.C.A. WijngaardsNov 19, 2019via osv
1 file changed · +120 27
  • ipsecmod/ipsecmod.c+120 27 modified
    @@ -161,6 +161,71 @@ generate_request(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id, uint8_t* name,
     	return 1;
     }
     
    +/**
    + * Check if the string passed is a valid domain name with safe characters to
    + * pass to a shell.
    + * This will only allow:
    + *  - digits
    + *  - alphas
    + *  - hyphen (not at the start)
    + *  - dot (not at the start, or the only character)
    + *  - underscore
    + * @param s: pointer to the string.
    + * @param slen: string's length.
    + * @return true if s only contains safe characters; false otherwise.
    + */
    +static int
    +domainname_has_safe_characters(char* s, size_t slen) {
    +	size_t i;
    +	for(i = 0; i < slen; i++) {
    +		if(s[i] == '\0') return 1;
    +		if((s[i] == '-' && i != 0)
    +			|| (s[i] == '.' && (i != 0 || s[1] == '\0'))
    +			|| (s[i] == '_') || (s[i] >= '0' && s[i] <= '9')
    +			|| (s[i] >= 'A' && s[i] <= 'Z')
    +			|| (s[i] >= 'a' && s[i] <= 'z')) {
    +			continue;
    +		}
    +		return 0;
    +	}
    +	return 1;
    +}
    +
    +/**
    + * Check if the stringified IPSECKEY RDATA contains safe characters to pass to
    + * a shell.
    + * This is only relevant for checking the gateway when the gateway type is 3
    + * (domainname).
    + * @param s: pointer to the string.
    + * @param slen: string's length.
    + * @return true if s contains only safe characters; false otherwise.
    + */
    +static int
    +ipseckey_has_safe_characters(char* s, size_t slen) {
    +	int precedence, gateway_type, algorithm;
    +	char* gateway;
    +	gateway = (char*)calloc(slen, sizeof(char));
    +	if(!gateway) {
    +		log_err("ipsecmod: out of memory when calling the hook");
    +		return 0;
    +	}
    +	if(sscanf(s, "%d %d %d %s ",
    +			&precedence, &gateway_type, &algorithm, gateway) != 4) {
    +		free(gateway);
    +		return 0;
    +	}
    +	if(gateway_type != 3) {
    +		free(gateway);
    +		return 1;
    +	}
    +	if(domainname_has_safe_characters(gateway, slen)) {
    +		free(gateway);
    +		return 1;
    +	}
    +	free(gateway);
    +	return 0;
    +}
    +
     /**
      *  Prepare the data and call the hook.
      *
    @@ -175,7 +240,7 @@ call_hook(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct ipsecmod_qstate* iq,
     {
     	size_t slen, tempdata_len, tempstring_len, i;
     	char str[65535], *s, *tempstring;
    -	int w;
    +	int w = 0, w_temp, qtype;
     	struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset_key;
     	struct packed_rrset_data* rrset_data;
     	uint8_t *tempdata;
    @@ -192,78 +257,106 @@ call_hook(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct ipsecmod_qstate* iq,
     	memset(s, 0, slen);
     
     	/* Copy the hook into the buffer. */
    -	sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "%s", qstate->env->cfg->ipsecmod_hook);
    +	w += sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "%s", qstate->env->cfg->ipsecmod_hook);
     	/* Put space into the buffer. */
    -	sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, " ");
    +	w += sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, " ");
     	/* Copy the qname into the buffer. */
     	tempstring = sldns_wire2str_dname(qstate->qinfo.qname,
     		qstate->qinfo.qname_len);
     	if(!tempstring) {
     		log_err("ipsecmod: out of memory when calling the hook");
     		return 0;
     	}
    -	sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "\"%s\"", tempstring);
    +	if(!domainname_has_safe_characters(tempstring, strlen(tempstring))) {
    +		log_err("ipsecmod: qname has unsafe characters");
    +		free(tempstring);
    +		return 0;
    +	}
    +	w += sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "\"%s\"", tempstring);
     	free(tempstring);
     	/* Put space into the buffer. */
    -	sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, " ");
    +	w += sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, " ");
     	/* Copy the IPSECKEY TTL into the buffer. */
     	rrset_data = (struct packed_rrset_data*)iq->ipseckey_rrset->entry.data;
    -	sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "\"%ld\"", (long)rrset_data->ttl);
    +	w += sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "\"%ld\"", (long)rrset_data->ttl);
     	/* Put space into the buffer. */
    -	sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, " ");
    -	/* Copy the A/AAAA record(s) into the buffer. Start and end this section
    -	 * with a double quote. */
    +	w += sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, " ");
     	rrset_key = reply_find_answer_rrset(&qstate->return_msg->qinfo,
     		qstate->return_msg->rep);
    +	/* Double check that the records are indeed A/AAAA.
    +	 * This should never happen as this function is only executed for A/AAAA
    +	 * queries but make sure we don't pass anything other than A/AAAA to the
    +	 * shell. */
    +	qtype = ntohs(rrset_key->rk.type);
    +	if(qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_AAAA && qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_A) {
    +		log_err("ipsecmod: Answer is not of A or AAAA type");
    +		return 0;
    +	}
     	rrset_data = (struct packed_rrset_data*)rrset_key->entry.data;
    -	sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "\"");
    +	/* Copy the A/AAAA record(s) into the buffer. Start and end this section
    +	 * with a double quote. */
    +	w += sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "\"");
     	for(i=0; i<rrset_data->count; i++) {
     		if(i > 0) {
     			/* Put space into the buffer. */
    -			sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, " ");
    +			w += sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, " ");
     		}
     		/* Ignore the first two bytes, they are the rr_data len. */
    -		w = sldns_wire2str_rdata_buf(rrset_data->rr_data[i] + 2,
    +		w_temp = sldns_wire2str_rdata_buf(rrset_data->rr_data[i] + 2,
     			rrset_data->rr_len[i] - 2, s, slen, qstate->qinfo.qtype);
    -		if(w < 0) {
    +		if(w_temp < 0) {
     			/* Error in printout. */
    -			return -1;
    -		} else if((size_t)w >= slen) {
    +			log_err("ipsecmod: Error in printing IP address");
    +			return 0;
    +		} else if((size_t)w_temp >= slen) {
     			s = NULL; /* We do not want str to point outside of buffer. */
     			slen = 0;
    -			return -1;
    +			log_err("ipsecmod: shell command too long");
    +			return 0;
     		} else {
    -			s += w;
    -			slen -= w;
    +			s += w_temp;
    +			slen -= w_temp;
    +			w += w_temp;
     		}
     	}
    -	sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "\"");
    +	w += sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "\"");
     	/* Put space into the buffer. */
    -	sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, " ");
    +	w += sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, " ");
     	/* Copy the IPSECKEY record(s) into the buffer. Start and end this section
     	 * with a double quote. */
    -	sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "\"");
    +	w += sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "\"");
     	rrset_data = (struct packed_rrset_data*)iq->ipseckey_rrset->entry.data;
     	for(i=0; i<rrset_data->count; i++) {
     		if(i > 0) {
     			/* Put space into the buffer. */
    -			sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, " ");
    +			w += sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, " ");
     		}
     		/* Ignore the first two bytes, they are the rr_data len. */
     		tempdata = rrset_data->rr_data[i] + 2;
     		tempdata_len = rrset_data->rr_len[i] - 2;
     		/* Save the buffer pointers. */
     		tempstring = s; tempstring_len = slen;
    -		w = sldns_wire2str_ipseckey_scan(&tempdata, &tempdata_len, &s, &slen,
    -			NULL, 0);
    +		w_temp = sldns_wire2str_ipseckey_scan(&tempdata, &tempdata_len, &s,
    +			&slen, NULL, 0);
     		/* There was an error when parsing the IPSECKEY; reset the buffer
     		 * pointers to their previous values. */
    -		if(w == -1){
    +		if(w_temp == -1) {
     			s = tempstring; slen = tempstring_len;
    +		} else if(w_temp > 0) {
    +			if(!ipseckey_has_safe_characters(
    +					tempstring, tempstring_len - slen)) {
    +				log_err("ipsecmod: ipseckey has unsafe characters");
    +				return 0;
    +			}
    +			w += w_temp;
     		}
     	}
    -	sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "\"");
    -	verbose(VERB_ALGO, "ipsecmod: hook command: '%s'", str);
    +	w += sldns_str_print(&s, &slen, "\"");
    +	if(w >= (int)sizeof(str)) {
    +		log_err("ipsecmod: shell command too long");
    +		return 0;
    +	}
    +	verbose(VERB_ALGO, "ipsecmod: shell command: '%s'", str);
     	/* ipsecmod-hook should return 0 on success. */
     	if(system(str) != 0)
     		return 0;
    

Vulnerability mechanics

Generated on May 9, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.

References

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