CVE-2018-6558
Description
The pam_fscrypt module in fscrypt before 0.2.4 may incorrectly restore primary and supplementary group IDs to the values associated with the root user, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a successful login through certain applications that use Linux-PAM (aka pam).
AI Insight
LLM-synthesized narrative grounded in this CVE's description and references.
The pam_fscrypt module in fscrypt before 0.2.4 incorrectly resets group IDs to root after login, enabling privilege escalation via applications using Linux-PAM.
Vulnerability
The pam_fscrypt module in fscrypt versions before 0.2.4 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability. After a successful login through applications that use Linux-PAM, the module may incorrectly restore the primary and supplementary group IDs to the values associated with the root user instead of the authenticated user [2]. This occurs in the SetProcessPrivileges function, which does not properly save and restore group credentials [3].
Exploitation
An attacker with a valid user account can exploit this by logging into a system that has pam_fscrypt configured in the PAM stack. During login, pam_fscrypt temporarily drops privileges to the target user, but upon cleanup it incorrectly sets the groups back to root (gid 0) [4]. No additional authentication or user interaction beyond normal login is required. The attacker simply authenticates through a PAM-enabled service such as login or SSH.
Impact
Successful exploitation results in the attacker gaining root group membership. This can allow them to execute commands with root group privileges, such as sudo (if the user is in the sudoers file), access files restricted to the root group, or perform other actions that require group 0 membership. The attacker does not obtain full root user privileges but escalates from a standard user to a user with root group capabilities [4].
Mitigation
This vulnerability is fixed in fscrypt version 0.2.4 [3]. Users are advised to upgrade to the latest version. As a workaround, the pam_fscrypt session module can be disabled in the PAM configuration until the upgrade is applied. The vulnerability is not listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog as of this writing.
AI Insight generated on May 22, 2026. Synthesized from this CVE's description and the cited reference URLs; citations are validated against the source bundle.
Affected packages
Versions sourced from the GitHub Security Advisory.
| Package | Affected versions | Patched versions |
|---|---|---|
github.com/google/fscryptGo | < 0.2.4 | 0.2.4 |
Affected products
2- Range: before 0.2.4
Patches
2315f9b042237Ensure keyring privilege changes are reversible
2 files changed · +49 −34
security/keyring.go+32 −28 modified@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ package security import ( "fmt" "log" - "os" "os/user" "sync" @@ -138,42 +137,47 @@ func UserKeyringID(target *user.User, checkSession bool) (int, error) { return targetKeyring, nil } -func userKeyringIDLookup(uid int) (int, error) { +func userKeyringIDLookup(uid int) (keyringID int, err error) { cacheLock.Lock() defer cacheLock.Unlock() - if keyringID, ok := keyringIDCache[uid]; ok { - return keyringID, nil - } - - ruid, euid := os.Getuid(), os.Geteuid() - // If all the ids do not agree, we will have to change them - needSetUids := uid != ruid || uid != euid - - // The value of KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING is determined by the real uid, so - // we must set the ruid appropriately. Note that this will also trigger - // the creation of the uid keyring if it does not yet exist. - if needSetUids { - defer setUids(ruid, euid) // Always reset privileges - if err := setUids(uid, 0); err != nil { - return 0, err + var ok bool + if keyringID, ok = keyringIDCache[uid]; ok { + return + } + + // Our goals here are to: + // - Find the user keyring (for the provided uid) + // - Link it into the current process keyring (so we can use it) + // - Make no permenant changes to the process privileges + // Complicating this are the facts that: + // - The value of KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING is determined by the ruid + // - Keyring linking permissions use the euid + // So we have to change both the ruid and euid to make this work, + // setting the suid to 0 so that we can later switch back. + ruid, euid, suid := getUids() + if ruid != uid || euid != uid { + if err = setUids(uid, uid, 0); err != nil { + return } + defer func() { + resetErr := setUids(ruid, euid, suid) + if resetErr != nil { + err = resetErr + } + }() } - keyringID, err := unix.KeyctlGetKeyringID(unix.KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING, true) + + // We get the value of KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING. Note that this will also + // trigger the creation of the uid keyring if it does not yet exist. + keyringID, err = unix.KeyctlGetKeyringID(unix.KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING, true) log.Printf("keyringID(_uid.%d) = %d, %v", uid, keyringID, err) if err != nil { return 0, err } - // We still want to use this key after our privileges are reset. If we - // link the key into the process keyring, we will possess it and still - // be able to use it. However, the permissions to link are based on the - // effective uid, so we must set the euid appropriately. - if needSetUids { - if err := setUids(0, uid); err != nil { - return 0, err - } - } - if err := keyringLink(keyringID, unix.KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING); err != nil { + // We still want to use this keyring after our privileges are reset. So + // we link it into the process keyring, preventing a loss of access. + if err = keyringLink(keyringID, unix.KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING); err != nil { return 0, err }
security/privileges.go+17 −6 modified@@ -142,11 +142,22 @@ func SetProcessPrivileges(privs *Privileges) error { return nil } -func setUids(ruid, euid int) error { - res, err := C.setreuid(C.uid_t(ruid), C.uid_t(euid)) - log.Printf("setreuid(%d, %d) = %d (errno %v)", ruid, euid, res, err) - if res == 0 { - return nil +func setUids(ruid, euid, suid int) error { + log.Printf("Setting ruid=%d euid=%d suid=%d", ruid, euid, suid) + // We elevate the all the privs before setting them. This prevents + // issues with (ruid=1000,euid=1000,suid=0), where just a single call + // to setresuid might fail with permission denied. + if res, err := C.setresuid(0, 0, 0); res < 0 { + return errors.Wrapf(err.(syscall.Errno), "setting uids") } - return errors.Wrapf(err.(syscall.Errno), "setting uids") + if res, err := C.setresuid(C.uid_t(ruid), C.uid_t(euid), C.uid_t(suid)); res < 0 { + return errors.Wrapf(err.(syscall.Errno), "setting uids") + } + return nil +} + +func getUids() (int, int, int) { + var ruid, euid, suid C.uid_t + C.getresuid(&ruid, &euid, &suid) + return int(ruid), int(euid), int(suid) }
3022c1603d96Ensure setting user privileges is reversible
2 files changed · +92 −87
pam/pam.go+16 −17 modified@@ -35,16 +35,14 @@ import ( "unsafe" "github.com/google/fscrypt/security" - "github.com/google/fscrypt/util" ) // Handle wraps the C pam_handle_t type. This is used from within modules. type Handle struct { - handle *C.pam_handle_t - status C.int - // OrigUser is the user who invoked the PAM module (usually root) - OrigUser *user.User - // PamUser is the user who the PAM module is for + handle *C.pam_handle_t + status C.int + origPrivs *security.Privileges + // PamUser is the user for whom the PAM module is running. PamUser *user.User } @@ -62,13 +60,8 @@ func NewHandle(pamh unsafe.Pointer) (*Handle, error) { return nil, err } - if h.PamUser, err = user.Lookup(C.GoString(pamUsername)); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - if h.OrigUser, err = util.EffectiveUser(); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - return h, nil + h.PamUser, err = user.Lookup(C.GoString(pamUsername)) + return h, err } func (h *Handle) setData(name string, data unsafe.Pointer, cleanup C.CleanupFunc) error { @@ -140,14 +133,20 @@ func (h *Handle) StartAsPamUser() error { if _, err := security.UserKeyringID(h.PamUser, true); err != nil { log.Printf("Setting up keyrings in PAM: %v", err) } - return security.SetProcessPrivileges(h.PamUser) + userPrivs, err := security.UserPrivileges(h.PamUser) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if h.origPrivs, err = security.ProcessPrivileges(); err != nil { + return err + } + return security.SetProcessPrivileges(userPrivs) } // StopAsPamUser restores the original privileges that were running the -// PAM module (this is usually root). As this error is often ignored in a defer -// statement, any error is also logged. +// PAM module (this is usually root). func (h *Handle) StopAsPamUser() error { - err := security.SetProcessPrivileges(h.OrigUser) + err := security.SetProcessPrivileges(h.origPrivs) if err != nil { log.Print(err) }
security/privileges.go+76 −70 modified@@ -43,30 +43,15 @@ package security // cgo maps them to different Go types. /* +#define _GNU_SOURCE // for getresuid and setresuid #include <sys/types.h> -#include <unistd.h> // setreuid, setregid -#include <grp.h> // setgroups - -static int my_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid) -{ - return setreuid(ruid, euid); -} - -static int my_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid) -{ - return setregid(rgid, egid); -} - -static int my_setgroups(size_t size, const gid_t *list) -{ - return setgroups(size, list); -} +#include <unistd.h> // getting and setting uids and gids +#include <grp.h> // setgroups */ import "C" import ( "log" - "os" "os/user" "syscall" @@ -75,72 +60,93 @@ import ( "github.com/google/fscrypt/util" ) -// SetProcessPrivileges temporarily drops the privileges of the current process -// to have the effective uid/gid of the target user. The privileges can be -// changed again with another call to SetProcessPrivileges. -func SetProcessPrivileges(target *user.User) error { - euid := util.AtoiOrPanic(target.Uid) - egid := util.AtoiOrPanic(target.Gid) - if os.Geteuid() == euid { - log.Printf("Privileges already set to %q", target.Username) - return nil - } - log.Printf("Setting privileges to %q", target.Username) +// Privileges encapulate the effective uid/gid and groups of a process. +type Privileges struct { + euid C.uid_t + egid C.gid_t + groups []C.gid_t +} - // If setting privs to root, we want to set the uid first, so we will - // then have the necessary permissions to perform the other actions. - if euid == 0 { - if err := setUids(-1, euid); err != nil { - return err - } - } - if err := setGids(-1, egid); err != nil { - return err - } - if err := setGroups(target); err != nil { - return err +// ProcessPrivileges returns the process's current effective privileges. +func ProcessPrivileges() (*Privileges, error) { + ruid := C.getuid() + euid := C.geteuid() + rgid := C.getgid() + egid := C.getegid() + + var groups []C.gid_t + n, err := C.getgroups(0, nil) + if n < 0 { + return nil, err } - // If not setting privs to root, we want to avoid dropping the uid - // util the very end. - if euid != 0 { - if err := setUids(-1, euid); err != nil { - return err + // If n == 0, the user isn't in any groups, so groups == nil is fine. + if n > 0 { + groups = make([]C.gid_t, n) + n, err = C.getgroups(n, &groups[0]) + if n < 0 { + return nil, err } + groups = groups[:n] } - return nil + log.Printf("Current privs (real, effective): uid=(%d,%d) gid=(%d,%d) groups=%v", + ruid, euid, rgid, egid, groups) + return &Privileges{euid, egid, groups}, nil } -func setUids(ruid, euid int) error { - res, err := C.my_setreuid(C.uid_t(ruid), C.uid_t(euid)) - log.Printf("setreuid(%d, %d) = %d (errno %v)", ruid, euid, res, err) - if res == 0 { - return nil +// UserPrivileges returns the defualt privileges for the specified user. +func UserPrivileges(user *user.User) (*Privileges, error) { + privs := &Privileges{ + euid: C.uid_t(util.AtoiOrPanic(user.Uid)), + egid: C.gid_t(util.AtoiOrPanic(user.Gid)), } - return errors.Wrapf(err.(syscall.Errno), "setting uids") + userGroups, err := user.GroupIds() + if err != nil { + return nil, util.SystemError(err.Error()) + } + privs.groups = make([]C.gid_t, len(userGroups)) + for i, group := range userGroups { + privs.groups[i] = C.gid_t(util.AtoiOrPanic(group)) + } + return privs, nil } -func setGids(rgid, egid int) error { - res, err := C.my_setregid(C.gid_t(rgid), C.gid_t(egid)) - log.Printf("setregid(%d, %d) = %d (errno %v)", rgid, egid, res, err) - if res == 0 { - return nil +// SetProcessPrivileges sets the privileges of the current process to have those +// specified by privs. The original privileges can be obtained by first saving +// the output of ProcessPrivileges, calling SetProcessPrivileges with the +// desired privs, then calling SetProcessPrivileges with the saved privs. +func SetProcessPrivileges(privs *Privileges) error { + log.Printf("Setting euid=%d egid=%d groups=%v", privs.euid, privs.egid, privs.groups) + + // If setting privs as root, we need to set the euid to 0 first, so that + // we will have the necessary permissions to make the other changes to + // the groups/egid/euid, regardless of our original euid. + C.seteuid(0) + + // Seperately handle the case where the user is in no groups. + numGroups := C.size_t(len(privs.groups)) + groupsPtr := (*C.gid_t)(nil) + if numGroups > 0 { + groupsPtr = &privs.groups[0] } - return errors.Wrapf(err.(syscall.Errno), "setting gids") -} -func setGroups(target *user.User) error { - groupStrings, err := target.GroupIds() - if err != nil { - return util.SystemError(err.Error()) + if res, err := C.setgroups(numGroups, groupsPtr); res < 0 { + return errors.Wrapf(err.(syscall.Errno), "setting groups") + } + if res, err := C.setegid(privs.egid); res < 0 { + return errors.Wrapf(err.(syscall.Errno), "setting egid") } - gids := make([]C.gid_t, len(groupStrings)) - for i, groupString := range groupStrings { - gids[i] = C.gid_t(util.AtoiOrPanic(groupString)) + if res, err := C.seteuid(privs.euid); res < 0 { + return errors.Wrapf(err.(syscall.Errno), "setting euid") } - res, err := C.my_setgroups(C.size_t(len(groupStrings)), &gids[0]) - log.Printf("setgroups(%v) = %d (errno %v)", gids, res, err) + ProcessPrivileges() + return nil +} + +func setUids(ruid, euid int) error { + res, err := C.setreuid(C.uid_t(ruid), C.uid_t(euid)) + log.Printf("setreuid(%d, %d) = %d (errno %v)", ruid, euid, res, err) if res == 0 { return nil } - return errors.Wrapf(err.(syscall.Errno), "setting groups") + return errors.Wrapf(err.(syscall.Errno), "setting uids") }
Vulnerability mechanics
Generated on May 9, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.
References
7- github.com/advisories/GHSA-qj26-7grj-whg3ghsaADVISORY
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-6558ghsaADVISORY
- github.com/google/fscrypt/commit/3022c1603d968c22f147b4a2c49c4637dd1be91bghsax_refsource_MISCWEB
- github.com/google/fscrypt/commit/315f9b042237200174a1fb99427f74027e191d66ghsax_refsource_MISCWEB
- github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/77ghsax_refsource_MISCWEB
- launchpad.net/bugs/1787548ghsax_refsource_MISCWEB
- pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2020-0027ghsaWEB
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