CVE-2016-1000237

@@ -4,7 +4,11 @@ var he = require('he');
 
 module.exports = sanitizeHtml;
 
-function sanitizeHtml(html, options) {
+// Ignore the _recursing flag; it's there for recursive
+// invocation as a guard against this exploit:
+// https://github.com/fb55/htmlparser2/issues/105
+
+function sanitizeHtml(html, options, _recursing) {
   var result = '';
 
   function Frame(tag, attribs) {
@@ -87,8 +91,8 @@ function sanitizeHtml(html, options) {
   var skipText = false;
   var parser = new htmlparser.Parser({
     onopentag: function(name, attribs) {
-     var frame = new Frame(name, attribs);
-     stack.push(frame);
+      var frame = new Frame(name, attribs);
+      stack.push(frame);
 
       var skip = false;
       if (_.has(transformTagsMap, name)) {
@@ -198,6 +202,18 @@ function sanitizeHtml(html, options) {
   });
   parser.write(html);
   parser.end();
+
+  // Invoke recursively until we stop finding
+  // clever little nesting exploits
+  if (!_recursing) {
+    while (true) {
+      var newResult = sanitizeHtml(result, options, true);
+      if (newResult === result) {
+        return result;
+      }
+      result = newResult;
+    }
+  }
   return result;
 
   function escapeHtml(s) {

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
   "license": "MIT",
   "dependencies": {
     "he": "~0.4.1",
-    "htmlparser2": "~3.3.0",
+    "htmlparser2": "3.7.x",
     "lodash": "2.4.x"
   }
 }

@@ -180,6 +180,10 @@ sanitizeHtml(
 
 ## Changelog
 
+1.4.3: invokes itself recursively until the markup stops changing to guard against [this issue](https://github.com/fb55/htmlparser2/issues/105). Bump to htmlparser2 version 3.7.x.
+
+1.4.1, 1.4.2: more tests.
+
 1.4.0: ability to  allow all attributes or tags through by setting `allowedAttributes` and/or `allowedTags` to false. Thanks to Anand Thakker.
 
 1.3.0: `attribs` now available on frames passed to exclusive filter.

@@ -281,6 +281,21 @@ describe('sanitizeHtml', function() {
         }
       ),
       ''
-    )
+    );
+  });
+  it('should not be faked out by double <', function() {
+    assert.equal(
+      sanitizeHtml('<<img src="javascript:evil"/>img src="javascript:evil"/>'
+      ),
+      ''
+    );
+    // I don't love what I get back here obviously, but
+    // it is not an attack vector, although it might be parsed
+    // by some browsers as containing an unbalanced close tag.
+    assert.equal(
+      sanitizeHtml('<<a href="javascript:evil"/>a href="javascript:evil"/>'
+      ),
+      '<<a>a href="javascript:evil"/></a>'
+    );
   });
 });