CVE-2015-2241

@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ def contents(self):
                     if getattr(attr, "allow_tags", False):
                         result_repr = mark_safe(result_repr)
                     else:
-                        result_repr = linebreaksbr(result_repr)
+                        result_repr = linebreaksbr(result_repr, autoescape=True)
             else:
                 if isinstance(f.rel, ManyToManyRel) and value is not None:
                     result_repr = ", ".join(map(six.text_type, value.all()))

@@ -2,9 +2,23 @@
 Django 1.7.6 release notes
 ==========================
 
-*Under Development*
+*March 9, 2015*
 
-Django 1.7.6 fixes several bugs in 1.7.5.
+Django 1.7.6 fixes a security issue and several bugs in 1.7.5.
+
+Mitigated an XSS attack via properties in ``ModelAdmin.readonly_fields``
+========================================================================
+
+The :attr:`ModelAdmin.readonly_fields
+<django.contrib.admin.ModelAdmin.readonly_fields>` attribute in the Django
+admin allows displaying model fields and model attributes. While the former
+were correctly escaped, the latter were not. Thus untrusted content could be
+injected into the admin, presenting an exploitation vector for XSS attacks.
+
+In this vulnerability, every model attribute used in ``readonly_fields`` that
+is not an actual model field (e.g. a :class:`property`) will **fail to be
+escaped** even if that attribute is not marked as safe. In this release,
+autoescaping is now correctly applied.
 
 Bugfixes
 ========

@@ -860,7 +860,7 @@ def get_formsets_with_inlines(self, request, obj=None):
 site = admin.AdminSite(name="admin")
 site.register(Article, ArticleAdmin)
 site.register(CustomArticle, CustomArticleAdmin)
-site.register(Section, save_as=True, inlines=[ArticleInline])
+site.register(Section, save_as=True, inlines=[ArticleInline], readonly_fields=['name_property'])
 site.register(ModelWithStringPrimaryKey)
 site.register(Color)
 site.register(Thing, ThingAdmin)

@@ -22,6 +22,13 @@ class Section(models.Model):
     """
     name = models.CharField(max_length=100)
 
+    @property
+    def name_property(self):
+        """
+        A property that simply returns the name. Used to test #24461
+        """
+        return self.name
+
 
 @python_2_unicode_compatible
 class Article(models.Model):

@@ -3862,6 +3862,15 @@ def test_readonly_field_overrides(self):
         self.assertContains(response, '<label for="id_public">Overridden public label:</label>', html=True)
         self.assertNotContains(response, "Some help text for the date (with unicode ŠĐĆŽćžšđ)")
 
+    def test_correct_autoescaping(self):
+        """
+        Make sure that non-field readonly elements are properly autoescaped (#24461)
+        """
+        section = Section.objects.create(name='<a>evil</a>')
+        response = self.client.get(reverse('admin:admin_views_section_change', args=(section.pk,)))
+        self.assertNotContains(response, "<a>evil</a>", status_code=200)
+        self.assertContains(response, "&lt;a&gt;evil&lt;/a&gt;", status_code=200)
+
 
 @override_settings(PASSWORD_HASHERS=('django.contrib.auth.hashers.SHA1PasswordHasher',))
 class LimitChoicesToInAdminTest(TestCase):

@@ -2,9 +2,23 @@
 Django 1.7.6 release notes
 ==========================
 
-*Under Development*
+*March 9, 2015*
 
-Django 1.7.6 fixes several bugs in 1.7.5.
+Django 1.7.6 fixes a security issue and several bugs in 1.7.5.
+
+Mitigated an XSS attack via properties in ``ModelAdmin.readonly_fields``
+========================================================================
+
+The :attr:`ModelAdmin.readonly_fields
+<django.contrib.admin.ModelAdmin.readonly_fields>` attribute in the Django
+admin allows displaying model fields and model attributes. While the former
+were correctly escaped, the latter were not. Thus untrusted content could be
+injected into the admin, presenting an exploitation vector for XSS attacks.
+
+In this vulnerability, every model attribute used in ``readonly_fields`` that
+is not an actual model field (e.g. a :class:`property`) will **fail to be
+escaped** even if that attribute is not marked as safe. In this release,
+autoescaping is now correctly applied.
 
 Bugfixes
 ========

@@ -870,7 +870,7 @@ def get_formsets_with_inlines(self, request, obj=None):
 site.site_url = '/my-site-url/'
 site.register(Article, ArticleAdmin)
 site.register(CustomArticle, CustomArticleAdmin)
-site.register(Section, save_as=True, inlines=[ArticleInline])
+site.register(Section, save_as=True, inlines=[ArticleInline], readonly_fields=['name_property'])
 site.register(ModelWithStringPrimaryKey)
 site.register(Color)
 site.register(Thing, ThingAdmin)

@@ -22,6 +22,13 @@ class Section(models.Model):
     """
     name = models.CharField(max_length=100)
 
+    @property
+    def name_property(self):
+        """
+        A property that simply returns the name. Used to test #24461
+        """
+        return self.name
+
 
 @python_2_unicode_compatible
 class Article(models.Model):

@@ -4644,6 +4644,15 @@ def test_readonly_field_overrides(self):
         self.assertContains(response, '<label for="id_public">Overridden public label:</label>', html=True)
         self.assertNotContains(response, "Some help text for the date (with unicode ŠĐĆŽćžšđ)")
 
+    def test_correct_autoescaping(self):
+        """
+        Make sure that non-field readonly elements are properly autoescaped (#24461)
+        """
+        section = Section.objects.create(name='<a>evil</a>')
+        response = self.client.get(reverse('admin:admin_views_section_change', args=(section.pk,)))
+        self.assertNotContains(response, "<a>evil</a>", status_code=200)
+        self.assertContains(response, "&lt;a&gt;evil&lt;/a&gt;", status_code=200)
+
 
 @override_settings(PASSWORD_HASHERS=['django.contrib.auth.hashers.SHA1PasswordHasher'],
     ROOT_URLCONF="admin_views.urls")