VYPR
Critical severity9.1NVD Advisory· Published May 24, 2012· Updated Apr 29, 2026

CVE-2011-3188

CVE-2011-3188

Description

The (1) IPv4 and (2) IPv6 implementations in the Linux kernel before 3.1 use a modified MD4 algorithm to generate sequence numbers and Fragment Identification values, which makes it easier for remote attackers to cause a denial of service (disrupted networking) or hijack network sessions by predicting these values and sending crafted packets.

Affected products

2

Patches

2
6e5714eaf77d

net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.

https://github.com/torvalds/linuxDavid S. MillerAug 4, 2011via nvd-ref
14 files changed · +223 361
  • drivers/char/random.c+8 341 modified
    @@ -1300,363 +1300,30 @@ ctl_table random_table[] = {
     };
     #endif 	/* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
     
    -/********************************************************************
    - *
    - * Random functions for networking
    - *
    - ********************************************************************/
    -
    -/*
    - * TCP initial sequence number picking.  This uses the random number
    - * generator to pick an initial secret value.  This value is hashed
    - * along with the TCP endpoint information to provide a unique
    - * starting point for each pair of TCP endpoints.  This defeats
    - * attacks which rely on guessing the initial TCP sequence number.
    - * This algorithm was suggested by Steve Bellovin.
    - *
    - * Using a very strong hash was taking an appreciable amount of the total
    - * TCP connection establishment time, so this is a weaker hash,
    - * compensated for by changing the secret periodically.
    - */
    -
    -/* F, G and H are basic MD4 functions: selection, majority, parity */
    -#define F(x, y, z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z))))
    -#define G(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) + (((x) ^ (y)) & (z)))
    -#define H(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z))
    -
    -/*
    - * The generic round function.  The application is so specific that
    - * we don't bother protecting all the arguments with parens, as is generally
    - * good macro practice, in favor of extra legibility.
    - * Rotation is separate from addition to prevent recomputation
    - */
    -#define ROUND(f, a, b, c, d, x, s)	\
    -	(a += f(b, c, d) + x, a = (a << s) | (a >> (32 - s)))
    -#define K1 0
    -#define K2 013240474631UL
    -#define K3 015666365641UL
    -
    -#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
    -
    -static __u32 twothirdsMD4Transform(__u32 const buf[4], __u32 const in[12])
    -{
    -	__u32 a = buf[0], b = buf[1], c = buf[2], d = buf[3];
    -
    -	/* Round 1 */
    -	ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 0] + K1,  3);
    -	ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 1] + K1,  7);
    -	ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[ 2] + K1, 11);
    -	ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[ 3] + K1, 19);
    -	ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + K1,  3);
    -	ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 5] + K1,  7);
    -	ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[ 6] + K1, 11);
    -	ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + K1, 19);
    -	ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 8] + K1,  3);
    -	ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 9] + K1,  7);
    -	ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[10] + K1, 11);
    -	ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[11] + K1, 19);
    -
    -	/* Round 2 */
    -	ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 1] + K2,  3);
    -	ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[ 3] + K2,  5);
    -	ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 5] + K2,  9);
    -	ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + K2, 13);
    -	ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + K2,  3);
    -	ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[11] + K2,  5);
    -	ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 0] + K2,  9);
    -	ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[ 2] + K2, 13);
    -	ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + K2,  3);
    -	ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[ 6] + K2,  5);
    -	ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 8] + K2,  9);
    -	ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[10] + K2, 13);
    -
    -	/* Round 3 */
    -	ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 3] + K3,  3);
    -	ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[ 7] + K3,  9);
    -	ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[11] + K3, 11);
    -	ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 2] + K3, 15);
    -	ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 6] + K3,  3);
    -	ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[10] + K3,  9);
    -	ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 1] + K3, 11);
    -	ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 5] + K3, 15);
    -	ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + K3,  3);
    -	ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[ 0] + K3,  9);
    -	ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 4] + K3, 11);
    -	ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 8] + K3, 15);
    -
    -	return buf[1] + b; /* "most hashed" word */
    -	/* Alternative: return sum of all words? */
    -}
    -#endif
    -
    -#undef ROUND
    -#undef F
    -#undef G
    -#undef H
    -#undef K1
    -#undef K2
    -#undef K3
    -
    -/* This should not be decreased so low that ISNs wrap too fast. */
    -#define REKEY_INTERVAL (300 * HZ)
    -/*
    - * Bit layout of the tcp sequence numbers (before adding current time):
    - * bit 24-31: increased after every key exchange
    - * bit 0-23: hash(source,dest)
    - *
    - * The implementation is similar to the algorithm described
    - * in the Appendix of RFC 1185, except that
    - * - it uses a 1 MHz clock instead of a 250 kHz clock
    - * - it performs a rekey every 5 minutes, which is equivalent
    - * 	to a (source,dest) tulple dependent forward jump of the
    - * 	clock by 0..2^(HASH_BITS+1)
    - *
    - * Thus the average ISN wraparound time is 68 minutes instead of
    - * 4.55 hours.
    - *
    - * SMP cleanup and lock avoidance with poor man's RCU.
    - * 			Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
    - *
    - */
    -#define COUNT_BITS 8
    -#define COUNT_MASK ((1 << COUNT_BITS) - 1)
    -#define HASH_BITS 24
    -#define HASH_MASK ((1 << HASH_BITS) - 1)
    +static u32 random_int_secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4] ____cacheline_aligned;
     
    -static struct keydata {
    -	__u32 count; /* already shifted to the final position */
    -	__u32 secret[12];
    -} ____cacheline_aligned ip_keydata[2];
    -
    -static unsigned int ip_cnt;
    -
    -static void rekey_seq_generator(struct work_struct *work);
    -
    -static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(rekey_work, rekey_seq_generator);
    -
    -/*
    - * Lock avoidance:
    - * The ISN generation runs lockless - it's just a hash over random data.
    - * State changes happen every 5 minutes when the random key is replaced.
    - * Synchronization is performed by having two copies of the hash function
    - * state and rekey_seq_generator always updates the inactive copy.
    - * The copy is then activated by updating ip_cnt.
    - * The implementation breaks down if someone blocks the thread
    - * that processes SYN requests for more than 5 minutes. Should never
    - * happen, and even if that happens only a not perfectly compliant
    - * ISN is generated, nothing fatal.
    - */
    -static void rekey_seq_generator(struct work_struct *work)
    +static int __init random_int_secret_init(void)
     {
    -	struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[1 ^ (ip_cnt & 1)];
    -
    -	get_random_bytes(keyptr->secret, sizeof(keyptr->secret));
    -	keyptr->count = (ip_cnt & COUNT_MASK) << HASH_BITS;
    -	smp_wmb();
    -	ip_cnt++;
    -	schedule_delayed_work(&rekey_work,
    -			      round_jiffies_relative(REKEY_INTERVAL));
    -}
    -
    -static inline struct keydata *get_keyptr(void)
    -{
    -	struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[ip_cnt & 1];
    -
    -	smp_rmb();
    -
    -	return keyptr;
    -}
    -
    -static __init int seqgen_init(void)
    -{
    -	rekey_seq_generator(NULL);
    +	get_random_bytes(random_int_secret, sizeof(random_int_secret));
     	return 0;
     }
    -late_initcall(seqgen_init);
    -
    -#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
    -__u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
    -				   __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
    -{
    -	__u32 seq;
    -	__u32 hash[12];
    -	struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
    -
    -	/* The procedure is the same as for IPv4, but addresses are longer.
    -	 * Thus we must use twothirdsMD4Transform.
    -	 */
    -
    -	memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
    -	hash[4] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
    -	memcpy(&hash[5], keyptr->secret, sizeof(__u32) * 7);
    -
    -	seq = twothirdsMD4Transform((const __u32 *)daddr, hash) & HASH_MASK;
    -	seq += keyptr->count;
    -
    -	seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
    -
    -	return seq;
    -}
    -EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_sequence_number);
    -#endif
    -
    -/*  The code below is shamelessly stolen from secure_tcp_sequence_number().
    - *  All blames to Andrey V. Savochkin <saw@msu.ru>.
    - */
    -__u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr)
    -{
    -	struct keydata *keyptr;
    -	__u32 hash[4];
    -
    -	keyptr = get_keyptr();
    -
    -	/*
    -	 *  Pick a unique starting offset for each IP destination.
    -	 *  The dest ip address is placed in the starting vector,
    -	 *  which is then hashed with random data.
    -	 */
    -	hash[0] = (__force __u32)daddr;
    -	hash[1] = keyptr->secret[9];
    -	hash[2] = keyptr->secret[10];
    -	hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
    -
    -	return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
    -}
    -
    -__u32 secure_ipv6_id(const __be32 daddr[4])
    -{
    -	const struct keydata *keyptr;
    -	__u32 hash[4];
    -
    -	keyptr = get_keyptr();
    -
    -	hash[0] = (__force __u32)daddr[0];
    -	hash[1] = (__force __u32)daddr[1];
    -	hash[2] = (__force __u32)daddr[2];
    -	hash[3] = (__force __u32)daddr[3];
    -
    -	return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
    -}
    -
    -#ifdef CONFIG_INET
    -
    -__u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
    -				 __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
    -{
    -	__u32 seq;
    -	__u32 hash[4];
    -	struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
    -
    -	/*
    -	 *  Pick a unique starting offset for each TCP connection endpoints
    -	 *  (saddr, daddr, sport, dport).
    -	 *  Note that the words are placed into the starting vector, which is
    -	 *  then mixed with a partial MD4 over random data.
    -	 */
    -	hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
    -	hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
    -	hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
    -	hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
    -
    -	seq = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret) & HASH_MASK;
    -	seq += keyptr->count;
    -	/*
    -	 *	As close as possible to RFC 793, which
    -	 *	suggests using a 250 kHz clock.
    -	 *	Further reading shows this assumes 2 Mb/s networks.
    -	 *	For 10 Mb/s Ethernet, a 1 MHz clock is appropriate.
    -	 *	For 10 Gb/s Ethernet, a 1 GHz clock should be ok, but
    -	 *	we also need to limit the resolution so that the u32 seq
    -	 *	overlaps less than one time per MSL (2 minutes).
    -	 *	Choosing a clock of 64 ns period is OK. (period of 274 s)
    -	 */
    -	seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real()) >> 6;
    -
    -	return seq;
    -}
    -
    -/* Generate secure starting point for ephemeral IPV4 transport port search */
    -u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport)
    -{
    -	struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
    -	u32 hash[4];
    -
    -	/*
    -	 *  Pick a unique starting offset for each ephemeral port search
    -	 *  (saddr, daddr, dport) and 48bits of random data.
    -	 */
    -	hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
    -	hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
    -	hash[2] = (__force u32)dport ^ keyptr->secret[10];
    -	hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
    -
    -	return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
    -}
    -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral);
    -
    -#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
    -u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
    -			       __be16 dport)
    -{
    -	struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
    -	u32 hash[12];
    -
    -	memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
    -	hash[4] = (__force u32)dport;
    -	memcpy(&hash[5], keyptr->secret, sizeof(__u32) * 7);
    -
    -	return twothirdsMD4Transform((const __u32 *)daddr, hash);
    -}
    -#endif
    -
    -#if defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP) || defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP_MODULE)
    -/* Similar to secure_tcp_sequence_number but generate a 48 bit value
    - * bit's 32-47 increase every key exchange
    - *       0-31  hash(source, dest)
    - */
    -u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
    -				__be16 sport, __be16 dport)
    -{
    -	u64 seq;
    -	__u32 hash[4];
    -	struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
    -
    -	hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
    -	hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
    -	hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
    -	hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
    -
    -	seq = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
    -	seq |= ((u64)keyptr->count) << (32 - HASH_BITS);
    -
    -	seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
    -	seq &= (1ull << 48) - 1;
    -
    -	return seq;
    -}
    -EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccp_sequence_number);
    -#endif
    -
    -#endif /* CONFIG_INET */
    -
    +late_initcall(random_int_secret_init);
     
     /*
      * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. Similar to urandom but
      * with the goal of minimal entropy pool depletion. As a result, the random
      * value is not cryptographically secure but for several uses the cost of
      * depleting entropy is too high
      */
    -DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [4], get_random_int_hash);
    +DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [MD5_DIGEST_WORDS], get_random_int_hash);
     unsigned int get_random_int(void)
     {
    -	struct keydata *keyptr;
     	__u32 *hash = get_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);
    -	int ret;
    +	unsigned int ret;
     
    -	keyptr = get_keyptr();
     	hash[0] += current->pid + jiffies + get_cycles();
    -
    -	ret = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
    +	md5_transform(hash, random_int_secret);
    +	ret = hash[0];
     	put_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);
     
     	return ret;
    
  • include/linux/random.h+0 12 modified
    @@ -57,18 +57,6 @@ extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
     extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
     void generate_random_uuid(unsigned char uuid_out[16]);
     
    -extern __u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr);
    -extern __u32 secure_ipv6_id(const __be32 daddr[4]);
    -extern u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport);
    -extern u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
    -				      __be16 dport);
    -extern __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
    -					__be16 sport, __be16 dport);
    -extern __u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
    -					  __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
    -extern u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
    -				       __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
    -
     #ifndef MODULE
     extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
     #endif
    
  • include/net/secure_seq.h+20 0 added
    @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
    +#ifndef _NET_SECURE_SEQ
    +#define _NET_SECURE_SEQ
    +
    +#include <linux/types.h>
    +
    +extern __u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr);
    +extern __u32 secure_ipv6_id(const __be32 daddr[4]);
    +extern u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport);
    +extern u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
    +				      __be16 dport);
    +extern __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
    +					__be16 sport, __be16 dport);
    +extern __u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
    +					  __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
    +extern u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
    +				       __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
    +extern u64 secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
    +					 __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
    +
    +#endif /* _NET_SECURE_SEQ */
    
  • net/core/Makefile+1 1 modified
    @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
     #
     
     obj-y := sock.o request_sock.o skbuff.o iovec.o datagram.o stream.o scm.o \
    -	 gen_stats.o gen_estimator.o net_namespace.o
    +	 gen_stats.o gen_estimator.o net_namespace.o secure_seq.o
     
     obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl_net_core.o
     
    
  • net/core/secure_seq.c+184 0 added
    @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
    +#include <linux/kernel.h>
    +#include <linux/init.h>
    +#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
    +#include <linux/module.h>
    +#include <linux/cache.h>
    +#include <linux/random.h>
    +#include <linux/hrtimer.h>
    +#include <linux/ktime.h>
    +#include <linux/string.h>
    +
    +#include <net/secure_seq.h>
    +
    +static u32 net_secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4] ____cacheline_aligned;
    +
    +static int __init net_secret_init(void)
    +{
    +	get_random_bytes(net_secret, sizeof(net_secret));
    +	return 0;
    +}
    +late_initcall(net_secret_init);
    +
    +static u32 seq_scale(u32 seq)
    +{
    +	/*
    +	 *	As close as possible to RFC 793, which
    +	 *	suggests using a 250 kHz clock.
    +	 *	Further reading shows this assumes 2 Mb/s networks.
    +	 *	For 10 Mb/s Ethernet, a 1 MHz clock is appropriate.
    +	 *	For 10 Gb/s Ethernet, a 1 GHz clock should be ok, but
    +	 *	we also need to limit the resolution so that the u32 seq
    +	 *	overlaps less than one time per MSL (2 minutes).
    +	 *	Choosing a clock of 64 ns period is OK. (period of 274 s)
    +	 */
    +	return seq + (ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real()) >> 6);
    +}
    +
    +#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
    +__u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
    +				   __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
    +{
    +	u32 secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4];
    +	u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
    +	u32 i;
    +
    +	memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
    +	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
    +		secret[i] = net_secret[i] + daddr[i];
    +	secret[4] = net_secret[4] +
    +		(((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport);
    +	for (i = 5; i < MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4; i++)
    +		secret[i] = net_secret[i];
    +
    +	md5_transform(hash, secret);
    +
    +	return seq_scale(hash[0]);
    +}
    +EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_sequence_number);
    +
    +u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
    +			       __be16 dport)
    +{
    +	u32 secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4];
    +	u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
    +	u32 i;
    +
    +	memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
    +	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
    +		secret[i] = net_secret[i] + (__force u32) daddr[i];
    +	secret[4] = net_secret[4] + (__force u32)dport;
    +	for (i = 5; i < MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4; i++)
    +		secret[i] = net_secret[i];
    +
    +	md5_transform(hash, secret);
    +
    +	return hash[0];
    +}
    +#endif
    +
    +#ifdef CONFIG_INET
    +__u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr)
    +{
    +	u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
    +
    +	hash[0] = (__force __u32) daddr;
    +	hash[1] = net_secret[13];
    +	hash[2] = net_secret[14];
    +	hash[3] = net_secret[15];
    +
    +	md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
    +
    +	return hash[0];
    +}
    +
    +__u32 secure_ipv6_id(const __be32 daddr[4])
    +{
    +	__u32 hash[4];
    +
    +	memcpy(hash, daddr, 16);
    +	md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
    +
    +	return hash[0];
    +}
    +
    +__u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
    +				 __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
    +{
    +	u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
    +
    +	hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
    +	hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
    +	hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
    +	hash[3] = net_secret[15];
    +
    +	md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
    +
    +	return seq_scale(hash[0]);
    +}
    +
    +u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport)
    +{
    +	u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
    +
    +	hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
    +	hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
    +	hash[2] = (__force u32)dport ^ net_secret[14];
    +	hash[3] = net_secret[15];
    +
    +	md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
    +
    +	return hash[0];
    +}
    +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral);
    +#endif
    +
    +#if defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP) || defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP_MODULE)
    +u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
    +				__be16 sport, __be16 dport)
    +{
    +	u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
    +	u64 seq;
    +
    +	hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
    +	hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
    +	hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
    +	hash[3] = net_secret[15];
    +
    +	md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
    +
    +	seq = hash[0] | (((u64)hash[1]) << 32);
    +	seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
    +	seq &= (1ull << 48) - 1;
    +
    +	return seq;
    +}
    +EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccp_sequence_number);
    +
    +#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
    +u64 secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
    +				  __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
    +{
    +	u32 secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4];
    +	u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
    +	u64 seq;
    +	u32 i;
    +
    +	memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
    +	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
    +		secret[i] = net_secret[i] + daddr[i];
    +	secret[4] = net_secret[4] +
    +		(((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport);
    +	for (i = 5; i < MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4; i++)
    +		secret[i] = net_secret[i];
    +
    +	md5_transform(hash, secret);
    +
    +	seq = hash[0] | (((u64)hash[1]) << 32);
    +	seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
    +	seq &= (1ull << 48) - 1;
    +
    +	return seq;
    +}
    +EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccpv6_sequence_number);
    +#endif
    +#endif
    
  • net/dccp/ipv4.c+1 0 modified
    @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
     #include <net/timewait_sock.h>
     #include <net/tcp_states.h>
     #include <net/xfrm.h>
    +#include <net/secure_seq.h>
     
     #include "ackvec.h"
     #include "ccid.h"
    
  • net/dccp/ipv6.c+2 7 modified
    @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
     #include <net/transp_v6.h>
     #include <net/ip6_checksum.h>
     #include <net/xfrm.h>
    +#include <net/secure_seq.h>
     
     #include "dccp.h"
     #include "ipv6.h"
    @@ -69,13 +70,7 @@ static inline void dccp_v6_send_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
     	dh->dccph_checksum = dccp_v6_csum_finish(skb, &np->saddr, &np->daddr);
     }
     
    -static inline __u32 secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
    -						  __be16 sport, __be16 dport   )
    -{
    -	return secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(saddr, daddr, sport, dport);
    -}
    -
    -static inline __u32 dccp_v6_init_sequence(struct sk_buff *skb)
    +static inline __u64 dccp_v6_init_sequence(struct sk_buff *skb)
     {
     	return secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr.s6_addr32,
     					     ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr.s6_addr32,
    
  • net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c+1 0 modified
    @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
     
     #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
     #include <net/inet_hashtables.h>
    +#include <net/secure_seq.h>
     #include <net/ip.h>
     
     /*
    
  • net/ipv4/inetpeer.c+1 0 modified
    @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
     #include <linux/net.h>
     #include <net/ip.h>
     #include <net/inetpeer.h>
    +#include <net/secure_seq.h>
     
     /*
      *  Theory of operations.
    
  • net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c+1 0 modified
    @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
     #include <linux/ip.h>
     
     #include <linux/netfilter.h>
    +#include <net/secure_seq.h>
     #include <net/netfilter/nf_nat.h>
     #include <net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.h>
     #include <net/netfilter/nf_nat_rule.h>
    
  • net/ipv4/route.c+1 0 modified
    @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@
     #include <linux/sysctl.h>
     #endif
     #include <net/atmclip.h>
    +#include <net/secure_seq.h>
     
     #define RT_FL_TOS(oldflp4) \
         ((u32)(oldflp4->flowi4_tos & (IPTOS_RT_MASK | RTO_ONLINK)))
    
  • net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c+1 0 modified
    @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@
     #include <net/timewait_sock.h>
     #include <net/xfrm.h>
     #include <net/netdma.h>
    +#include <net/secure_seq.h>
     
     #include <linux/inet.h>
     #include <linux/ipv6.h>
    
  • net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c+1 0 modified
    @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
     #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
     #include <net/inet_hashtables.h>
     #include <net/inet6_hashtables.h>
    +#include <net/secure_seq.h>
     #include <net/ip.h>
     
     int __inet6_hash(struct sock *sk, struct inet_timewait_sock *tw)
    
  • net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c+1 0 modified
    @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
     #include <net/timewait_sock.h>
     #include <net/netdma.h>
     #include <net/inet_common.h>
    +#include <net/secure_seq.h>
     
     #include <asm/uaccess.h>
     
    
bc0b96b54a21

crypto: Move md5_transform to lib/md5.c

https://github.com/torvalds/linuxDavid S. MillerAug 4, 2011via nvd-ref
4 files changed · +102 92
  • crypto/md5.c+1 91 modified
    @@ -21,99 +21,9 @@
     #include <linux/module.h>
     #include <linux/string.h>
     #include <linux/types.h>
    +#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
     #include <asm/byteorder.h>
     
    -#define F1(x, y, z)	(z ^ (x & (y ^ z)))
    -#define F2(x, y, z)	F1(z, x, y)
    -#define F3(x, y, z)	(x ^ y ^ z)
    -#define F4(x, y, z)	(y ^ (x | ~z))
    -
    -#define MD5STEP(f, w, x, y, z, in, s) \
    -	(w += f(x, y, z) + in, w = (w<<s | w>>(32-s)) + x)
    -
    -static void md5_transform(u32 *hash, u32 const *in)
    -{
    -	u32 a, b, c, d;
    -
    -	a = hash[0];
    -	b = hash[1];
    -	c = hash[2];
    -	d = hash[3];
    -
    -	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[0] + 0xd76aa478, 7);
    -	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[1] + 0xe8c7b756, 12);
    -	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[2] + 0x242070db, 17);
    -	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[3] + 0xc1bdceee, 22);
    -	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[4] + 0xf57c0faf, 7);
    -	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[5] + 0x4787c62a, 12);
    -	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[6] + 0xa8304613, 17);
    -	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[7] + 0xfd469501, 22);
    -	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[8] + 0x698098d8, 7);
    -	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[9] + 0x8b44f7af, 12);
    -	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffff5bb1, 17);
    -	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[11] + 0x895cd7be, 22);
    -	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x6b901122, 7);
    -	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[13] + 0xfd987193, 12);
    -	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xa679438e, 17);
    -	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[15] + 0x49b40821, 22);
    -
    -	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[1] + 0xf61e2562, 5);
    -	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[6] + 0xc040b340, 9);
    -	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x265e5a51, 14);
    -	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[0] + 0xe9b6c7aa, 20);
    -	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[5] + 0xd62f105d, 5);
    -	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[10] + 0x02441453, 9);
    -	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0xd8a1e681, 14);
    -	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[4] + 0xe7d3fbc8, 20);
    -	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[9] + 0x21e1cde6, 5);
    -	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[14] + 0xc33707d6, 9);
    -	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[3] + 0xf4d50d87, 14);
    -	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[8] + 0x455a14ed, 20);
    -	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0xa9e3e905, 5);
    -	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[2] + 0xfcefa3f8, 9);
    -	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[7] + 0x676f02d9, 14);
    -	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[12] + 0x8d2a4c8a, 20);
    -
    -	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[5] + 0xfffa3942, 4);
    -	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[8] + 0x8771f681, 11);
    -	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x6d9d6122, 16);
    -	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[14] + 0xfde5380c, 23);
    -	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[1] + 0xa4beea44, 4);
    -	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[4] + 0x4bdecfa9, 11);
    -	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[7] + 0xf6bb4b60, 16);
    -	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[10] + 0xbebfbc70, 23);
    -	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0x289b7ec6, 4);
    -	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[0] + 0xeaa127fa, 11);
    -	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[3] + 0xd4ef3085, 16);
    -	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[6] + 0x04881d05, 23);
    -	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[9] + 0xd9d4d039, 4);
    -	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[12] + 0xe6db99e5, 11);
    -	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0x1fa27cf8, 16);
    -	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[2] + 0xc4ac5665, 23);
    -
    -	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[0] + 0xf4292244, 6);
    -	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[7] + 0x432aff97, 10);
    -	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xab9423a7, 15);
    -	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[5] + 0xfc93a039, 21);
    -	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x655b59c3, 6);
    -	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[3] + 0x8f0ccc92, 10);
    -	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffeff47d, 15);
    -	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[1] + 0x85845dd1, 21);
    -	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[8] + 0x6fa87e4f, 6);
    -	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[15] + 0xfe2ce6e0, 10);
    -	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[6] + 0xa3014314, 15);
    -	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[13] + 0x4e0811a1, 21);
    -	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[4] + 0xf7537e82, 6);
    -	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[11] + 0xbd3af235, 10);
    -	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[2] + 0x2ad7d2bb, 15);
    -	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[9] + 0xeb86d391, 21);
    -
    -	hash[0] += a;
    -	hash[1] += b;
    -	hash[2] += c;
    -	hash[3] += d;
    -}
    -
     /* XXX: this stuff can be optimized */
     static inline void le32_to_cpu_array(u32 *buf, unsigned int words)
     {
    
  • include/linux/cryptohash.h+5 0 modified
    @@ -8,6 +8,11 @@
     void sha_init(__u32 *buf);
     void sha_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *W);
     
    +#define MD5_DIGEST_WORDS 4
    +#define MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES 64
    +
    +void md5_transform(__u32 *hash, __u32 const *in);
    +
     __u32 half_md4_transform(__u32 buf[4], __u32 const in[8]);
     
     #endif
    
  • lib/Makefile+1 1 modified
    @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ endif
     lib-y := ctype.o string.o vsprintf.o cmdline.o \
     	 rbtree.o radix-tree.o dump_stack.o timerqueue.o\
     	 idr.o int_sqrt.o extable.o prio_tree.o \
    -	 sha1.o irq_regs.o reciprocal_div.o argv_split.o \
    +	 sha1.o md5.o irq_regs.o reciprocal_div.o argv_split.o \
     	 proportions.o prio_heap.o ratelimit.o show_mem.o \
     	 is_single_threaded.o plist.o decompress.o find_next_bit.o
     
    
  • lib/md5.c+95 0 added
    @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
    +#include <linux/kernel.h>
    +#include <linux/module.h>
    +#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
    +
    +#define F1(x, y, z)	(z ^ (x & (y ^ z)))
    +#define F2(x, y, z)	F1(z, x, y)
    +#define F3(x, y, z)	(x ^ y ^ z)
    +#define F4(x, y, z)	(y ^ (x | ~z))
    +
    +#define MD5STEP(f, w, x, y, z, in, s) \
    +	(w += f(x, y, z) + in, w = (w<<s | w>>(32-s)) + x)
    +
    +void md5_transform(__u32 *hash, __u32 const *in)
    +{
    +	u32 a, b, c, d;
    +
    +	a = hash[0];
    +	b = hash[1];
    +	c = hash[2];
    +	d = hash[3];
    +
    +	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[0] + 0xd76aa478, 7);
    +	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[1] + 0xe8c7b756, 12);
    +	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[2] + 0x242070db, 17);
    +	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[3] + 0xc1bdceee, 22);
    +	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[4] + 0xf57c0faf, 7);
    +	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[5] + 0x4787c62a, 12);
    +	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[6] + 0xa8304613, 17);
    +	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[7] + 0xfd469501, 22);
    +	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[8] + 0x698098d8, 7);
    +	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[9] + 0x8b44f7af, 12);
    +	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffff5bb1, 17);
    +	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[11] + 0x895cd7be, 22);
    +	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x6b901122, 7);
    +	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[13] + 0xfd987193, 12);
    +	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xa679438e, 17);
    +	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[15] + 0x49b40821, 22);
    +
    +	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[1] + 0xf61e2562, 5);
    +	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[6] + 0xc040b340, 9);
    +	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x265e5a51, 14);
    +	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[0] + 0xe9b6c7aa, 20);
    +	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[5] + 0xd62f105d, 5);
    +	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[10] + 0x02441453, 9);
    +	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0xd8a1e681, 14);
    +	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[4] + 0xe7d3fbc8, 20);
    +	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[9] + 0x21e1cde6, 5);
    +	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[14] + 0xc33707d6, 9);
    +	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[3] + 0xf4d50d87, 14);
    +	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[8] + 0x455a14ed, 20);
    +	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0xa9e3e905, 5);
    +	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[2] + 0xfcefa3f8, 9);
    +	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[7] + 0x676f02d9, 14);
    +	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[12] + 0x8d2a4c8a, 20);
    +
    +	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[5] + 0xfffa3942, 4);
    +	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[8] + 0x8771f681, 11);
    +	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x6d9d6122, 16);
    +	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[14] + 0xfde5380c, 23);
    +	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[1] + 0xa4beea44, 4);
    +	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[4] + 0x4bdecfa9, 11);
    +	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[7] + 0xf6bb4b60, 16);
    +	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[10] + 0xbebfbc70, 23);
    +	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0x289b7ec6, 4);
    +	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[0] + 0xeaa127fa, 11);
    +	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[3] + 0xd4ef3085, 16);
    +	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[6] + 0x04881d05, 23);
    +	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[9] + 0xd9d4d039, 4);
    +	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[12] + 0xe6db99e5, 11);
    +	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0x1fa27cf8, 16);
    +	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[2] + 0xc4ac5665, 23);
    +
    +	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[0] + 0xf4292244, 6);
    +	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[7] + 0x432aff97, 10);
    +	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xab9423a7, 15);
    +	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[5] + 0xfc93a039, 21);
    +	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x655b59c3, 6);
    +	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[3] + 0x8f0ccc92, 10);
    +	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffeff47d, 15);
    +	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[1] + 0x85845dd1, 21);
    +	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[8] + 0x6fa87e4f, 6);
    +	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[15] + 0xfe2ce6e0, 10);
    +	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[6] + 0xa3014314, 15);
    +	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[13] + 0x4e0811a1, 21);
    +	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[4] + 0xf7537e82, 6);
    +	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[11] + 0xbd3af235, 10);
    +	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[2] + 0x2ad7d2bb, 15);
    +	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[9] + 0xeb86d391, 21);
    +
    +	hash[0] += a;
    +	hash[1] += b;
    +	hash[2] += c;
    +	hash[3] += d;
    +}
    +EXPORT_SYMBOL(md5_transform);
    

Vulnerability mechanics

Generated by null/stub on May 9, 2026. Inputs: CWE entries + fix-commit diffs from this CVE's patches. Citations validated against bundle.

References

7

News mentions

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