CVE-2010-2064
Description
Local users can exploit a symlink vulnerability in rpcbind 0.2.0's predictable temporary files to write arbitrary files or gain privileges.
AI Insight
LLM-synthesized narrative grounded in this CVE's description and references.
Local users can exploit a symlink vulnerability in rpcbind 0.2.0's predictable temporary files to write arbitrary files or gain privileges.
Vulnerability
rpcbind version 0.2.0 creates temporary files /tmp/portmap.xdr and /tmp/rpcbind.xdr in the world-writable /tmp directory without using safe file creation practices [1]. This allows a local user to perform a symlink attack by placing a symbolic link with the same name before the daemon starts, pointing to an arbitrary file that the rpcbind process can write to [2].
Exploitation
An attacker needs local access to the system and the ability to create files in /tmp before the rpcbind daemon is started. The attacker can create a symbolic link from either /tmp/portmap.xdr or /tmp/rpcbind.xdr to a target file, such as a system configuration file. When rpcbind starts, it will follow the symlink and write data to the target location [3].
Impact
Successful exploitation allows a local attacker to write to arbitrary files with the privileges of the rpcbind process (typically root), potentially leading to privilege escalation or a denial of service by overwriting critical system files [1].
Mitigation
The vulnerability is fixed in rpcbind version 0.2.0-4.1 (Debian) which changed the state directory to /var/run/rpcbind, which is only writable by root [4]. Red Hat Enterprise Linux was not affected as it used a secure state directory /var/lib/rpcbind [3]. Users should update to a patched version or ensure the state directory is not in a world-writable location.
AI Insight generated on May 26, 2026. Synthesized from this CVE's description and the cited reference URLs; citations are validated against the source bundle.
Affected products
2Patches
0No patches discovered yet.
Vulnerability mechanics
No source-code context for this CVE — mechanics is only generated when we can read the actual fix diff. Without that, the four sections (root cause, attack vector, affected code, fix) would be speculation rather than analysis.
References
4- access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2010-2064mitrex_refsource_MISC
- bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgimitrex_refsource_MISC
- security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2010-2064mitrex_refsource_MISC
- www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/06/08/3mitremailing-listx_refsource_MLIST
News mentions
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