CVE-2010-1155

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ int net_ip_compare(IPADDR *ip1, IPADDR *ip2);
 /* Connect to socket */
 GIOChannel *net_connect(const char *addr, int port, IPADDR *my_ip);
 /* Connect to socket with ip address and SSL*/
-GIOChannel *net_connect_ip_ssl(IPADDR *ip, int port, IPADDR *my_ip, const char *cert, const char *pkey, const char *cafile, const char *capath, gboolean verify);
+GIOChannel *net_connect_ip_ssl(IPADDR *ip, int port, const char* hostname, IPADDR *my_ip, const char *cert, const char *pkey, const char *cafile, const char *capath, gboolean verify);
 int irssi_ssl_handshake(GIOChannel *handle);
 /* Connect to socket with ip address */
 GIOChannel *net_connect_ip(IPADDR *ip, int port, IPADDR *my_ip);

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
 #include <openssl/pem.h>
 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
@@ -39,6 +40,7 @@ typedef struct
 	SSL *ssl;
 	SSL_CTX *ctx;
 	unsigned int verify:1;
+	const char *hostname;
 } GIOSSLChannel;
 
 static SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = NULL;
@@ -53,7 +55,149 @@ static void irssi_ssl_free(GIOChannel *handle)
 	g_free(chan);
 }
 
-static gboolean irssi_ssl_verify(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
+/* Checks if the given string has internal NUL characters. */
+static gboolean has_internal_nul(const char* str, int len) {
+	/* Remove trailing nul characters. They would give false alarms */
+	while (len > 0 && str[len-1] == 0)
+		len--;
+	return strlen(str) != len;
+}
+
+/* tls_dns_name - Extract valid DNS name from subjectAltName value */
+static const char *tls_dns_name(const GENERAL_NAME * gn)
+{
+	const char *dnsname;
+
+	/* We expect the OpenSSL library to construct GEN_DNS extension objects as
+	   ASN1_IA5STRING values. Check we got the right union member. */
+	if (ASN1_STRING_type(gn->d.ia5) != V_ASN1_IA5STRING) {
+		g_warning("Invalid ASN1 value type in subjectAltName");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* Safe to treat as an ASCII string possibly holding a DNS name */
+	dnsname = (char *) ASN1_STRING_data(gn->d.ia5);
+
+	if (has_internal_nul(dnsname, ASN1_STRING_length(gn->d.ia5))) {
+		g_warning("Internal NUL in subjectAltName");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return dnsname;
+}
+
+/* tls_text_name - extract certificate property value by name */
+static char *tls_text_name(X509_NAME *name, int nid)
+{
+	int     pos;
+	X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry;
+	ASN1_STRING *entry_str;
+	int     utf8_length;
+	unsigned char *utf8_value;
+	char *result;
+
+	if (name == 0 || (pos = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, nid, -1)) < 0) {
+		return NULL;
+    }
+
+    entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, pos);
+    g_return_val_if_fail(entry != NULL, NULL);
+    entry_str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry);
+    g_return_val_if_fail(entry_str != NULL, NULL);
+
+    /* Convert everything into UTF-8. It's up to OpenSSL to do something
+	   reasonable when converting ASCII formats that contain non-ASCII
+	   content. */
+    if ((utf8_length = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&utf8_value, entry_str)) < 0) {
+    	g_warning("Error decoding ASN.1 type=%d", ASN1_STRING_type(entry_str));
+    	return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (has_internal_nul((char *)utf8_value, utf8_length)) {
+    	g_warning("NUL character in hostname in certificate");
+    	OPENSSL_free(utf8_value);
+    	return NULL;
+    }
+
+    result = g_strdup((char *) utf8_value);
+	OPENSSL_free(utf8_value);
+	return result;
+}
+
+
+/** check if a hostname in the certificate matches the hostname we used for the connection */
+static gboolean match_hostname(const char *cert_hostname, const char *hostname)
+{
+	const char *hostname_left;
+
+	if (!strcasecmp(cert_hostname, hostname)) { /* exact match */
+		return TRUE;
+	} else if (cert_hostname[0] == '*' && cert_hostname[1] == '.' && cert_hostname[2] != 0) { /* wildcard match */
+		/* The initial '*' matches exactly one hostname component */
+		hostname_left = strchr(hostname, '.');
+		if (hostname_left != NULL && ! strcasecmp(hostname_left + 1, cert_hostname + 2)) {
+			return TRUE;
+		}
+	}
+	return FALSE;
+}
+
+/* based on verify_extract_name from tls_client.c in postfix */
+static gboolean irssi_ssl_verify_hostname(X509 *cert, const char *hostname)
+{
+	int gen_index, gen_count;
+	gboolean matched = FALSE, has_dns_name = FALSE;
+	const char *cert_dns_name;
+	char *cert_subject_cn;
+	const GENERAL_NAME *gn;
+	STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) * gens;
+
+	/* Verify the dNSName(s) in the peer certificate against the hostname. */
+	gens = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, 0, 0);
+	if (gens) {
+		gen_count = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens);
+		for (gen_index = 0; gen_index < gen_count && !matched; ++gen_index) {
+			gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, gen_index);
+			if (gn->type != GEN_DNS)
+				continue;
+
+			/* Even if we have an invalid DNS name, we still ultimately
+			   ignore the CommonName, because subjectAltName:DNS is
+			   present (though malformed). */
+			has_dns_name = TRUE;
+			cert_dns_name = tls_dns_name(gn);
+			if (cert_dns_name && *cert_dns_name) {
+				matched = match_hostname(cert_dns_name, hostname);
+			}
+    	}
+
+	    /* Free stack *and* member GENERAL_NAME objects */
+	    sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(gens, GENERAL_NAME_free);
+	}
+
+	if (has_dns_name) {
+		if (! matched) {
+			/* The CommonName in the issuer DN is obsolete when SubjectAltName is available. */
+			g_warning("None of the Subject Alt Names in the certificate match hostname '%s'", hostname);
+		}
+		return matched;
+	} else { /* No subjectAltNames, look at CommonName */
+		cert_subject_cn = tls_text_name(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NID_commonName);
+	    if (cert_subject_cn && *cert_subject_cn) {
+	    	matched = match_hostname(cert_subject_cn, hostname);
+	    	if (! matched) {
+				g_warning("SSL certificate common name '%s' doesn't match host name '%s'", cert_subject_cn, hostname);
+	    	}
+	    } else {
+	    	g_warning("No subjectAltNames and no valid common name in certificate");
+	    }
+	    free(cert_subject_cn);
+	}
+
+	return matched;
+}
+
+static gboolean irssi_ssl_verify(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx, const char* hostname, X509 *cert)
 {
 	if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) != X509_V_OK) {
 		unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
@@ -89,6 +233,8 @@ static gboolean irssi_ssl_verify(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
 			}
 		}
 		return FALSE;
+	} else if (! irssi_ssl_verify_hostname(cert, hostname)){
+		return FALSE;
 	}
 	return TRUE;
 }
@@ -241,7 +387,7 @@ static gboolean irssi_ssl_init(void)
 
 }
 
-static GIOChannel *irssi_ssl_get_iochannel(GIOChannel *handle, const char *mycert, const char *mypkey, const char *cafile, const char *capath, gboolean verify)
+static GIOChannel *irssi_ssl_get_iochannel(GIOChannel *handle, const char *hostname, const char *mycert, const char *mypkey, const char *cafile, const char *capath, gboolean verify)
 {
 	GIOSSLChannel *chan;
 	GIOChannel *gchan;
@@ -326,6 +472,7 @@ static GIOChannel *irssi_ssl_get_iochannel(GIOChannel *handle, const char *mycer
 	chan->ssl = ssl;
 	chan->ctx = ctx;
 	chan->verify = verify;
+	chan->hostname = hostname;
 
 	gchan = (GIOChannel *)chan;
 	gchan->funcs = &irssi_ssl_channel_funcs;
@@ -336,14 +483,14 @@ static GIOChannel *irssi_ssl_get_iochannel(GIOChannel *handle, const char *mycer
 	return gchan;
 }
 
-GIOChannel *net_connect_ip_ssl(IPADDR *ip, int port, IPADDR *my_ip, const char *cert, const char *pkey, const char *cafile, const char *capath, gboolean verify)
+GIOChannel *net_connect_ip_ssl(IPADDR *ip, int port, const char* hostname, IPADDR *my_ip, const char *cert, const char *pkey, const char *cafile, const char *capath, gboolean verify)
 {
 	GIOChannel *handle, *ssl_handle;
 
 	handle = net_connect_ip(ip, port, my_ip);
 	if (handle == NULL)
 		return NULL;
-	ssl_handle  = irssi_ssl_get_iochannel(handle, cert, pkey, cafile, capath, verify);
+	ssl_handle  = irssi_ssl_get_iochannel(handle, hostname, cert, pkey, cafile, capath, verify);
 	if (ssl_handle == NULL)
 		g_io_channel_unref(handle);
 	return ssl_handle;
@@ -385,7 +532,7 @@ int irssi_ssl_handshake(GIOChannel *handle)
 		g_warning("SSL server supplied no certificate");
 		return -1;
 	}
-	ret = !chan->verify || irssi_ssl_verify(chan->ssl, chan->ctx, cert);
+	ret = !chan->verify || irssi_ssl_verify(chan->ssl, chan->ctx, chan->hostname, cert);
 	X509_free(cert);
 	return ret ? 0 : -1;
 }

@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ static void server_real_connect(SERVER_REC *server, IPADDR *ip,
 		port = server->connrec->proxy != NULL ?
 			server->connrec->proxy_port : server->connrec->port;
 		handle = server->connrec->use_ssl ?
-			net_connect_ip_ssl(ip, port, own_ip, server->connrec->ssl_cert, server->connrec->ssl_pkey,
+			net_connect_ip_ssl(ip, port, server->connrec->address, own_ip, server->connrec->ssl_cert, server->connrec->ssl_pkey,
 server->connrec->ssl_cafile, server->connrec->ssl_capath, server->connrec->ssl_verify) :
 			net_connect_ip(ip, port, own_ip);
 	} else {